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Faculty and Deans

PUNISHING CHILDREN IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
Cynthia V. Ward*
INTRODUCTION

Consider the facts in this attempted murder case, which California prosecutors filed in 1996:
Defendant told a witness that the victim's family "looked at him
wrong," and that in return he, Defendant, "had to kill the baby." 1 Defendant and two acquaintances then went to the victim's apartment
when the victim's parents were out grocery shopping and had left
their infant son with his eighteen-year-old stepsister, who was in the
bathroom and did not hear Defendant and his friends enter the
house. 2 Defendant went to the baby's bedroom, took the baby, fourweek-old Ignacio Bermudez, out of his bassinet, dropped him on the
floor, and proceeded to beat the infant in the head with his fists, feet,
and a stick. Defendant and his accomplices then stole property from
the house and departed. Mter the assault, Defendant threatened a
female witness with harm if she reported the incident. Defendant
then told a family member about the attack; the family member reported him to the authorities. Questioned about the attack, Defendant first lied about it, then eventually re-enacted the assault in a
videotaped interview with police.3
Doctors determined that Ignacio Bermudez had suffered "global"
brain damage from the attack. 4 Eighteen months after the assault, the
baby was unable to see, walk, or make intelligible sounds. 5 According
to a media report at the time, "Doctors say nothing less than a miracle
©
2006 Cynthia V. Ward. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary.
1 Greg Beck, Suspected Baby-Beating Child To Stay in Custody, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr.
27, 1996, at Al (quoting prosecutor Harold Jewett).
2 !d.
3 !d.
4 !d.
5 Id.
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will restore Ignacio to health." 6 California prosecutors described Defendant as the "ringleader" in the attack and charged him with attempted murder. 7 The defense did not dispute the essential facts. 8
Is Defendant guilty?
Now consider one additional fact: at the time of his assault on
Ignacio Bermudez, Defendant was six years old.9 Should the single
circumstance of age make a difference to Defendant's guilt or
punishment?
For most of the twentieth century the law's answer was "yes." Preadolescent offenders, even violent ones, were routinely found not responsible and were instead routed through the non-punitive juvenile
system, which emphasized treatment and rehabilitation over blame.
But the "youth excuse" has come under strong attack in response to
high levels of public concern over the violent and harmful actions of
young defendants. 10 Over the past two decades the states have significantly revamped their criminal codes to make it easier to punish children who commit violent offenses. 11 The fact that a six-year-old was
6 Mary Curti us, Life of Tears and Hope for Beaten Baby's Family, L.A TIMES, Nov. 2,
1997, at Al.
7 ld.
8 !d.
9 !d. Because of his juvenile status, Defendant's full name was not used in the
media, which referred to him only as "Brandon T."
10 For example, in a television interview, former California Governor Pete Wilson
explained: "We cannot ignore the fact that there are kids ... who are committing
violent adult felonies, and we cannot tolerate it. And youth is no excuse for committing murder, robbery, rape, home invasions, or for terrorizing entire neighborhoods."
NewsHour with jim Lehrer: Juvenile Justice (PBS television broadcast Feb. 29, 2000), available at http:/ /www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/youth/janjune00/justice_2-29.html. Contrary to the impression one sometimes receives from scholarship in the field, this view
has been recently expressed not only in the United States but also in Europe. See, e.g.,
Home Office, No More Excuses: A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in England and Wales (Nov. 30, 1997), http:/ /www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/jou-nomore-excuses?wiel==html. ("An excuse culture has developed within the youth justice
system. It excuses itself for its inefficiency, and too often excuses the young offenders
before it, implying that they cannot help their behaviour because of their social circumstances.... The system allows them to go on wrecking their own lives as well as
disrupting their families and communities.").
ll See, e.g., RkhardJ. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YouTH ON TRIAL 73, 84 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds.,
2000) ("Alarmed by an increase in violent offenses (especially gun homicides) by
juveniles, most states during the past decade revised their codes pertaining to the
adjudication of youths charged with serious and violent offenses."); CarrieS. Fried &
N. Dickon Reppucci, Criminal Decision Making: The Development of Adolescent Judgment,
Criminal Responsibility, and Culpability, 25 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 45, 45-46 (2001) ("The
1980s and 1990s were characterized by increasingly adult-like treatment of juveniles in
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actually charged with attempted murder 12 reflects the change in attitude that underlies this trend: twenty years ago even the most serious
cases involving children under seven were adjudicated in juvenile
court, and in a non-punitive fashion. 13 The law has changed dramatically, to the point where some states now allow judicial waiver of children into adult court at any age, at least when the child is charged
with a serious offense. 14 And in a small but growing number of cases,
adult-sized punishment is in fact being inflicted-even when it involves a sentence of life without parole. 15
The issue of punishing children for crime has exposed a divide
between the political actors who design and enforce the law, and
the coun system and increased focus on the protection of the community rather than
the protection of the juvenile defendant. Between 1992 and 1995, forty-one states
enacted laws making it easier to prosecute juveniles in adult criminal court. Other
legislative mechanisms that emphasize punishment over rehabilitation of juveniles include minimum sentencing requirements, blended sentencing that allows juveniles to
be sentenced past the age of twenty one years, and revision of confidentiality provisions in favor of more open proceedings and records." (citing MELISSA S1CKMUND ET
AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE jUSTICE., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIGfiMS (1997))).
12 The court in the case dropped the charge to assault with intent to do bodily
harm, before eventually deciding that the defendant, known in public only as Brandon T., was not competent to stand trial. Frontline: Little Criminals (PBS television
broadcast May 13, 1997), available at http:/ /www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/little/etc/script.html; see infra Part I.A.2.b.
13 See, e.g., Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredatvr Myth: "Why Infancy Is
the Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 7 5 N.Y. U. L. REv. 159, 1 73-80 (2000)
(recounting the history of infancy defense in juvenile court).
14 See, e.g., Lisa Beresford, Note, Is Lowering the Age at "Which juveniles Can Be
Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment,
37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 783, 800 n.l35 (2000) (citing as examples the states of Alaska,
Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, and South Carolina).
15 See, e.g., LYNN CoTHERN, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, CooRDINATING CouNCIL oN
jUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 10 (2000), available at http:/ /V..'WW.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/184748.pdf ("The justice system's recent shift toward
stronger punishment policies has been marked not only by increased use of the death
penalty but by increases in the number of offenders-including juveniles who committed offenses prior to their 18th birthdays-being sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole .... The overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions
allow life without parole for offenders younger than age 16. Some even make it
mandatory for defendants convicted of certain offenses in criminal court. In Washington State, offenders as young as 8 can be sentenced to life. In Vermont, 10-yearolds can face the sentence." (footnotes omitted)). ln Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
574 (2005), of course, the United States Supreme Court held that defendants who
were under age eighteen at the time of their crimes may not be sentenced to death.
See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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those in the academy who evaluate its justification and effect. 16 The
law itself has moved strongly and consistently ir:t the direction of convicting and punishing juveniles who commit violent offenses. Politicians speak loudly in favor of "send[ing] a message to violent
criminals of all ages" 17 and of" 'putting these juvenile criminals where
they need to be-behind bars in the adult prisons.' " 18 Although legislators often cite the values of deterrence and public protection as reasons for the punitive turn toward juveniles, 19 the angry tone of the
debate also signals the presence of a strong retributive impulse. 20
16 See, e.g., David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and juvenile Transfer:
How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEx. L. REv. 1555, 1569-73 (2004);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEx. L. REv. 799, 829-39
(2003); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & PoL'v
REv. 143, 158-73 (2003).
17 John Caher, Rhetoric and Reality in the Pataki Era, TIMES UNION (Albany), Jan.
18, 1998, at A6 (quoting New York Governor George Pataki); see also Michael Finnegan, Governor Urges Hard Hits on Young Criminals, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Dec. 10, 1995, at 8
(quoting Governor Pataki's statement: "It's time we take that same tough approach to
juvenile crime that we take to violent crime in general.").
18 Mark Hollis, House Weighs Treating 16-, 17-year-olds as Adults, S. FLA. SuN-SENTINEL, Mar. 30, 2000, at lB. (quoting Sandy Murman, Florida State Representative); see
also David Judson, Juvenile Crime Legislation Expanded, Not Stiffened, GANNETT NEws SERVICE, Oct. 21, 1998 ("The main initiative to fail amid the last-minute horse-trading [in
the U.S. Congress] was a proposal sponsored chiefly by Rep. Bill McCollum, R.-Fla.,
and Sen. Orrin Hatch, R.-Utah, that would have provided states as much as $2.5 billion over five years to crack down on juvenile crime, add judges and build new youth
lockups. The price of the aid, however, required states to adopt rules encouraging
prosecutors to try more juveniles as adults, and in cases of particularly heinous crimes,
seek the death penalty for offenders as young as 15.").
19 For example, Florida state senator Gary Siegel, R.-Longwood, who favored passage of a new bill that "cracks down" on juvenile crime, was quoted as saying:
'juveniles all over the state are aware of what we're doing and they want to see how
we're going to address this epidemic increase in crime. They are waiting for our
signal." Curtis Krueger, Senate Passes juvenile Crime Bill Unanimously, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1994, at 4B; see also Caher, supra note 17 ("'Let's send a message to
violent criminals of all ages: If you assault our people, you will land in prison.'" (quoting George E. Pataki, New York Governor)).
20 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 807. Scott and Steinberg explain
that the trend toward punishing juveniles criminally "has features of moral panic" and
that "the elements of a moral panic include an intense community concern (often
triggered by a publicized incident) that is focused on deviant behavior, an exaggerated perception of the seriousness of the threat and the number of offenders, and
collective hostility toward the offenders, who are perceived as outsiders threatening
the community. !d.; see also Bazelon, supra note 13, at 179 ("The current wave of
crime reform is characterized by the sentiment that the punishment should fit the
crime, not the criminal. This just deserts' approach is designed to 'crack[ ] down
especially hard on juvenile offenders,' whom many believe 'are now coddled by a

2006]

PUNISHING CHILDREN IN THE CRIMINAL LAW

433

But the punitive turn toward young offenders conflicts head-on
with the received view of legal scholars that important differences between children and adults-and even between older adolescents and
adults-mandate separate, and gentler, treatment of juveniles who
commit serious crimes.2 1
Considerable irony attends this debate. In the 1970s and 1980s, a
vocal "Children's Rights" movement argued passionately for the proposition that adolescents were as competent as adults to make many
important life decisions, including the decisions to drink alcohol, to
consent to medical treatment, and to have an abortion without consulting a parent. 22 Accompanying this movement were behavioral
studies purporting to discover that, in important and legally relevant
respects, the cognitive capacities of adolescents equal those of
adults 23 :
Contrary to the stereotype of adolescents as markedly egocentric,
for example, or as handicapped by deficiencies in logical ability,
studies show that adolescents (at least, from age fifteen on) are no
more likely than adults to suffer from the "personal fable" (the belief that one's behavior is somehow not governed by the same rules
justice system that clings to a discredited belief in rehabilitation."' (quoting ELLIOT
CuRRIE, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICA 4 ( 1998))).
21 See, e.g., Brink, supra note 16, at 1557 ("For a variety of reasons, juveniles tend
to be less competent in discriminating right from wrong and in being able to regulate
successfully their actions in accord with these discriminations. If they are less competent, then [on a retributive theory of punishment] they are less responsible. But then
the trend to try juveniles as adults mistakenly assesses the punishment juveniles deserve by the wrong or harm they have done, ignoring their diminished responsibility
for this wrong or harm."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 801 ("Using the tools of
developmental psychology, we examine two important dimensions of adolescence
that distinguish this group from adults in ways that are important to criminal culpability. Because these developmental factors influence their criminal choices, young
wrongdoers are less blameworthy than adults under conventional criminal law conceptions of mitigation."); Bazelon, supra note 13, at 163 ("Only by retaining the distinctions between the mental capacities of pre teenage children on the one hand, and
adolescents, or fully mature adults on the other, can juvenile courts ensure that the
sanctions imposed are consistent with fundamental notions of fairness and due process.); see also Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 11, at 93-98 (arguing on grounds both of
competence and culpability that children and adolescents should not be held as responsible as adults who commit facially similar offenses).
22 See Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile justice Counterreuolution: Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY LJ.
65, 91-92 (1999).
23 Young children-those under the age of ten-were generally excepted from
these findings; with respect to them, it was generally conceded that cognitive differences did justify different treatment from that accorded to adults. See, e.g., Brink,
supra note 16, at 1570; Bazelon, supra note 13, at 163.
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of nature that apply to everyone else, as when a cigarette smoker
believes that he is immune to the health effects of smoking) and no
less likely than adults to employ rational algorithms in decisionmaking situations. In fact, there is substantial evidence that adolescents are well aware of the risks they take ....2 4

The authors go on to note that "[t]hese findings about a relative
lack of differences between adolescents and adults were used by youth
advocates in the 1980s to argue for the expansion of the rights afforded to minors. In particular, independent access to abortion was
at the center of a vigorous moral, political, and legal debate."2 5
Based in large part on the lack of differences found in the informed consent literature, a number of psychologists supported the
adolescent autonomy position. 26 In its amicus brief in the Supreme
Court case of Hodgson v. Minnesota, 27 for example, the American Psychological Association (APA) cited abundant studies supporting the
claim that juveniles possess sufficient maturity to decide, without adult
consultation, whether or not to have an abortion. 28 "[B]y middle adolescence (age 14-15)," the APA report concluded, "young people develop abilities similar to adults in reasoning about moral dilemmas,
understanding social rules and laws, [and] reasoning about interpersonal relationships and interpersonal problems .... " 29
When, in the 1990s, such research formed the basis for the argument that adolescents ought not only to be accorded rights, but also
24 Elizabeth Cauffman et a!., justice Jar juveniles: New PfJTspectives on Adolescents' Competence and Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 403, 407 (1999) (citing Marilyn JacobsQuadrel eta!., Adolescent (ln)vulnfJTability, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 102 (1993)).
25 /d. at 408.
26 Jd. at 408-09; see also Fried & Reppucci, supra note 11, at 46 ("Adolescent decision making has been studied in several legally relevant contexiS, including competence to make abortion decisions, consent to medical treatment and waiver of
Miranda righiS. In general, these studies have found that, past the age of 14 years,
adolescents are competent decision makers under the informed-consent model as
long as they are of average or above-average intelligence." (citations omitted) (citing
THOMAS GRisso, jUVENILES' WAIVER oF RIGHTS (1981); Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents' Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent
toAbmtion, 16 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 129 (1992); Louis A. Weithorn, Children's Capacities in
Legal Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAw (N. Dickon Reppucci eta!.
eds., 1984))).
27 497 U.S. 417,457-58 (1990) (striking down state law requiring that minor females notify both pareniS and then wait forty-eight hours before having an abortion as
unconstitutional because it was not reasonably related to legitimate state interesiS).
28 Brief for American Psychological Association et a!. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 18-20, Hodson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)
(Nos. 88-1125 & 88-1309).
29 /d. at 19 (footnotes omitted).
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assigned responsibility (including criminal responsibility) for their behavior, the children's movement found that studies demonstrating the
substantially equal capacities of adolescents and adults
proved to be a double-edged sword. How could adolescents be mature enough to make their own decisions about abortion, but not
mature enough to face the consequences of committing armed robbery or using marijuana? The very existence of a separate justice
system for juveniles is predicated in part on the assumption that the
basic competencies of adolescents and adults differ in fundamental
ways that affect judgment. If adolescents and adults are equally capable decision-makers, the argument that adolescents suffer from
"diminished responsibility" is called into question. Indeed, the very
same evidence that had been used to advocate for young people's
autonomy in medical decision-making could provide-and has provided for recent calls to treatjuvenile delinquents as adults within
our legal and penal systems. 30

The argument against juvenile liability becomes even more difficult when one considers that the threshold capacities required for
criminal responsibility may well be lower than those required competently to exercise some rights for which children's advocates have
fought. As Professor Stephen Morse has insightfully explained, the
crimes for which children are subject to punishment as adults are almost always intentional crimes involving the knowing infliction of serious harm on a victim. 31 Adolescents as well as adult offenders know
that the acts do inflict such harm. 32 It seems facially incoherent to
argue (1) that the adolescent who intentionally shoots and kills his
teacher should not be held responsible because he lacks even the fundamental capacity to realize that shooting someone will inflict serious
30 Cauffman, et al., supra note 24, at 408-09.
31 Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
15, 53-54 (1997) ("Adolescent criminal conduct for the most part involves the intentional infliction of harm: the offender intentionally killed, inflicted grievous bodily
harm, raped, stole, destroyed, or burned. That is, it is the adolescent's conscious
objective to cause in the immediate future precisely the harm the law prohibits. Unless serious adolescent offenders are specially unlucky or unskillful, they are practically certain to produce the harm that is their conscious objective, and they know
it."). This is not always the case, of course. For example, a case in New York this
spring involved a nine-year-old charged with manslaughter for stabbing her girlfriend
to death during a dispute over a ball. Associated Press, Girl, 9, Charged with Stabbing
I I -year-old Pal, May 31, 2005, http:/ /www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8044197 (last visited
Sept. 29, 2006).
32 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 54. ("The intentional hanndoer knows that
the conduct invades the interests of others·, those interests may be given little value or
otherwise ignored or rationalized away, but they must be present to the adolescent's
mind.").
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harm, and (2) that adolescents as a class have sufficient maturity and
judgment to decide whether or not to have an abortion. Reduced to
its essentials, the claim seems to be that adolescents should be treated
as adults for the purposes of distributing rights and benefits, and as
children for the purposes of assigning responsibility and punishment.
But what justifies that view? Since the very same traits and characteristics-the capacity for instrumental reasoning, an appreciation of the
consequences of acting, the ability to assess the moral underpinnings
of one's decision-undergird the arguments for rights and for responsibilities, it is difficult to see what principle or principles support such
a theory.
Nonetheless, a burgeoning literature seeks routes around this
problem, arguing against equal treatment of adolescents in the criminal law and for the retention of a rule that distinguishes children as a
class and treats them as non-culpable, or less culpable, for their otherwise criminal offenses. 33 The scholarship does this either by making
the case that the studies so heavily relied upon by the children's autonomy movement were, after all, badly flawed; 34 or by arguing that
even if those studies were not inherently flawed on their own terms,
they did not take account of all relevant adolescent differences, and
that once such additional differences are considered, it becomes clear
that adolescents should not be criminally punished on the same terms
as adults. 35 Most recendy, scholars holding this view have hailed the
33 See, e.g., Brink, supra note 16, at 1585; Cauffman et al., supra note 24, at 404;
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 801; Bazelon, supra note 13, at 162.
34 See, e.g., Cauffman et a!., supra note 24, at 406-07 ("Most studies of cognitive
development that used the informed consent framework have found few major differences between adults and youth about fifteen years of age and older. However, the
foundation of this empirical work is fragile, as most of the investigations suffer from
various methodological limitations, including small, unrepresentative, usually white,
middle class samples of youth taking part in laboratory studies rather than in studies
that compare adolescent and adult performance under conditions that adequately
resemble daily life.»); id. at 408 ("Based in large part on the lack of differences found
in the informed consent literature, a number of psychologists supported the adolescent autonomy advocates' position. Their assessment of the research was not unanimously supported, however, as critics warned that the limitations of extant research
failed to justifY strong policy arguments about adolescents' equivalence to adults.");
id. at 411 ("It is our position that the conclusion that adolescent judgment is
equivalent to that of adults is both tenuous and ill suited for legal policymaking.").
35 See, e.g., id. at 411 ("We posit that if psychosocial factors are taken into consideration in addition to the cognitive factors that are typically assessed, significant differences between adolescents and adults will emerge. Such differences reflect
genuine differences in capacities ... [that] provide a psychological basis for drawing
legal distinctions between adolescents and adults.»); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence
Steinberg, Researching Adolescents' judgment and Culpability, in YouTH ON TRIAL, supra
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arrival of brain-imaging studies that trace the behavioral differences
between adolescents and adults to differences in brain development
between the two groups. 36 In 2005 the United States Supreme Court
entered the fray, holding in the case of Roper v. Simmons"' 7 that a defendant who was not yet eighteen at the time he committed intentional murder could not constitutionally be executed for his crime
because, in large part, relevant differences between juveniles and
adults make the former less culpable for crime. 38 To the extent that
the Court's rationale transcends the specific context of capital punishment,39 the Court has joined forces with the scholarly wing of the debate and, in a meaningful sense, divided the law from itself.
In general, the "difference" scholars have limited their discussion
to comparing adolescents with adults. Most take as a starting assumption that young children should not be held criminally responsible
under any circumstances. Thus, in general the debate in the literanote 11, at 325, 326-37 (differences in adolescents' "maturity of judgment" may justify different treatment by the criminal law); Elizabeth Scott, Criminal Responsibility in
Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 11, at
291, 293 (differences in adolescent decision-making capacity justify different treatment by the criminal law). At a couple of points, Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg suggest that those who believe juveniles should be held responsible for crime
may be motivated by racism. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 809 ("A troubling explanation for the puzzling hostility toward young law violators is that attitudes
are driven by racial and ethnic bias."); id. at 837 ("A developmentally-informed
boundary constraining decisionmakers represents a collective pre-commitment to recognizing the mitigating character of youth in assigning blame. This concern is critical, given the evidence that illegitimate racial and ethnic biases influence attitudes
about the punishment of young offenders and that decisionmakers appear to discount the mitigating impact of immaturity in minority youths.").
36 See, e.g., Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the
Law: A Role in juvenile justice?, 3 Omo ST.j. CRIM. L. 321, 327 (2006); Kevin W. Saunders, A Disconnect Between Law and Neuroscience: Modem Brain Science, Media Influences,
and juvenile justice, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 695, 697-98 (" [N)ew understandings of the
developing brain lead to the conclusion that children should not be subject to the
same sorts of punishment that may be appropriate for adult offenders."); see also infra
text accompanying notes 123-26 (concluding that studies alone cannot determine
when to hold someone criminally responsible).
37 543 u.s. 551 (2005).
38 Id. at 569-75 (detailing differences between juveniles and adults that, in the
Court's view, lessen the criminal culpability of the former).
39 It may not. As the basis for its holding the Court discussed differences between
juveniles and adults that, in its view, explained why defendants under the age of eighteen "cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders"-that is, among
those offenders who merit the death penalty. Jd. at 553. The Court did not address
the question of whether juvenile offenders should be criminally liable at all. I d. at
569.
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ture focuses on whether offenders of age fourteen or older ought to
be excluded from criminal liability as a class. 40
But this age-circumscribed discussion, while important in some
ways, ultimately fails to engage either the dimensions or the nationwide attraction of the punitive turn toward children in the criminal
law. As noted above, that move toward punishing children as adults
does not merely address the question of whether the age of criminal
responsibility should be lowered to fifteen or fourteen. In at least
twenty-eight states, the minimum age at which a child can be transferred to adult court is under fourteen, 4 I and in some states there is
no lower limit at least for the most serious offenses. 42 Indeed, the
most controversial cases in recent years involve serious crimes committed by much younger children who, like Ignacio Bermudez's attacker,
seem at the time of their acts to "know what they are doing." 43 Increasingly the law allows such cases to be prosecuted, and such defendants to be punished, in the criminal system. This punitive turn
toward pre-adolescent children is the latest sign that the law has repudiated the philosophy of redemption which generated, and long
animated, the juvenile justice system, and is replacing it with a belief
in the necessity of punishing "Bad Seeds." 44 At least in part, this belief
40 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HoFSTRA L.
REv. 547, 550 (2000) ("[A] justice policy that treats adolescence as a distinct legal
category not only will promote youth welfare, but will also advance utilitarian objectives of reducing the costs of youth crime."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 799
(analyzing the case of Lionel Tate).
41 See, e.g., OFFICE OF juVENILE jUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T
OF JusTICE, jUVENILE jusTICE 17 (1999) (listing minimum age for judicial waiver in the
various states).
42 See, e.g., Beresford, supra note 14, at 800 n.l35.
43 See, e.g., infra note 52 and accompanying text (recounting case of Nathaniel
Abraham). Consider, also, the case of Eric Morse, a five-year-old boy who in 1994 was
thrown off a building to his death by two other boys, aged ten and eleven after he
refused to steal candy for them. For a detailed account of the murder of Eric Morse,
see LLOYD NEWMAN ET AL., OuR AMERICA 87-155 (1997).
44 Contrary to the received scholarly view, our European allies have experienced
a similar development during the past quarter century. See, e.g., CoNFRONTING YouTH
IN EuRoPE 25 Qill Mehlbye & Lode Walgrave eds., 1998) (noting that in Europe
"[t]he age of criminal responsibility varies a lot. In England young delinquents from
the age of 10 can be prosecuted for their offences. In Scotland this is theoretically
possible from the age of8. In Ireland this is even the case from the age of7."); id. at
22-23 ("Shortly after the critical sixties and seventies, macro-evolutions in European
societies deeply influenced juvenile delinquency and the way to deal with it.... Public
opinion and governments were inclined towards an increased punitive approach to
delinquency. The pure rehabilitative model appeared more and more to be naive.
As a consequence, attention to the :iustice' element in dealing with juvenile offenders
became more important, including a stricter punishment-orientation."); Maud
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is premised on the retributive intuition that some children who commit violent crimes are innately, or at least irredeemably, evil, and that
they deserve to suffer as much punishment as do adults who inflict
similar harms on society. 45 But the continuing controversy over the
issue indicates that, whatever the law may now allow, as a society we
are not yet fully convinced of the Bad Seed theory. When it comes to
punishing children for crime, age does still make a difference.
If the behavior of Brandon T. would otheJWise qualify him as
criminally responsible, should the single fact of his age change that
legal status? If so, why? If not, why do we still flinch at the thought of
a six-year-old being sent to prison for a brutal, and admittedly intentional, act? Beyond the specific issue of juvenile liability, cases such as
that of Brandon T. offer the chance to think more broadly about the
elements of criminal responsibility and the arguments that justify and
sustain criminal punishment.
Two intuitions fuel widespread scholarly opposition to punishing
children for crime. Not coincidentally, they are the same two beliefs
that gave rise to the juvenile justice system more than a century ago.
The first goes to the elements of responsibility, claiming that children
lack the threshold understanding and cognitive capacity to be "guilty"
for a harmful act. 46 The second focuses not on mental capacity per se,
but on children's inherent potential for growth and change. 47
Whatever a child has done, (s)he is still a child, a person who will
someday grow up to be an adult. To inflict a long term of punishment
on a child is, ultimately, to visit suffering on a different being-the
adult whom the child will become-from the person who committed
the act. That, the argument goes, is unjust.
Frouke de Boer-Buquicchio, Deputy Sec. Gen., Council of Eur., Kilbrandon Lecture:
Justice for Europe's Children· (Dec. 1, 2003), available at http://www.gccs.gla.ac.uk/
pages/kilbrandon.hun. (noting, and regretting, that "the age of criminal responsibility varies considerably across Member States from as young as age 7 up to age 18").
45 For example, Florida state senator Ander Crenshaw has been quoted as saying:
"There are some (juvenile] offenders who are lost, ... (t]hey have no sense of remorse, they are defiant by nature and they are never going to change." Krueger,
supra note 19. Additionally, when interviewed on Frontline, psychiatrist Martin
Blinder, who had interviewed the six-year-old who attacked Ignacio Bermudez,
opined: "The problem, to me, stems from my conviction that this sort of character
disorder, and certainly a character disorder of this early severity, is probably largely
genetic. There is something to be said for the phrase 'natural born killer.' It's my
view that most of what 1 found was predestined by his genetic endowment." Frontline:
Little Criminals, supra note 12.
46 See infra Part I.A.2.a-b.
4 7 See infra Part ILA.
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In this Article, I use the case of Brandon T. to examine both of
these intuitions about punishing children for crime. In Part I, I discuss the elements of criminal responsibility and examine the bases for
what I call the Culpability Thesis-the claim that children, by definition and as a class, do not possess the understanding, experience, and
cognitive capacities necessary to be held criminally liable. I conclude
that none of these arguments mandates the conclusion that children
must be categorically excluded from criminal responsibility.
Working from the conclusion in Part I that children can be criminally responsible, I move on in Part II to examine the Redemption
Thesis-the claim that, whatever their mental state and understanding at the time of the harmful act, children's capacity for redemption
should exculpate them from criminal responsibility. I distinguish the
issue of corrigibility from that of liability and acknowledge that, although not directly relevant to responsibility, corrigibility might well
matter to the separate question of how much convicted criminals
should be punished for crime. I conclude, though, that the Redemption Thesis-particularly to the extent it is used to draw a bright line
between adults and juveniles for purposes of the criminal law-is
more complex than it appears. If the capacity for redemption really is
a value that should inform criminal punishment, it is a value that cuts
against separating children and adults for purposes of the criminal
law.
In reaching these conclusions I rely on, and make repeated reference to, the excellent work of Stephen Morse on the subject of juvenile responsibility for crime. 48 Professor Morse's insights as to the
proper standard of criminal culpability generally-as to the application of that standard to adolescents, and, as to the significance to
criminal guilt of differences between adolescents and adults-have added greatly to the otherwise lopsided scholarly literature on this important subject. But, like virtually every other commentator on the
subject, Professor Morse limits his analysis to the issue of criminal liability for adolescents, and explicitly and categorically excludes young
children-even those who, like Brandon T., have committed violent
crimes that have inflicted serious harm-from responsibility on the
ground that "the issue of full or substantial responsibility is not seriously in contention for young children." 49 The current structure of
the criminal law argues otherwise, and, I contend, only by allowing
ourselves to think deeply about cases such as those of Brandon T.48 See Stephen]. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CruM. L. 397 (2006); Morse, supra note 31.
49 Morse, supra note 31, at 52.
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involving young children who do, in fact, commit heinous offensescan we understand, and do justice to, the reasons for the punitive turn
toward children in the criminallaw. 50
Ultimately, this Article seeks a rational account of the law of criminal responsibility as it actually is, and particularly of the emerging
view that children, even young children, can and should be criminally
punished for seriously harmful acts. It is tempting to dismiss this
profound change in the law with the thought that legislators who
favor expansion of juvenile liability are simply playing politics, responding to public concern about juvenile crime in order to get reelected and with no thought to the underlying values involved. It is
true that legislative concern about juvenile crime has sometimes followed controversial cases involving horrific acts by very young defendants. 51 But what this reveals is not the superficial nature of politics;
instead, it demonstrates the weakness of the rationales that have traditionally supported a separate juvenile justice system. When a six-yearold plans, strategizes, and ultimately inflicts a terrible harm on someone it immediately and graphically gives the lie to the idea that children cannot possess the requisite mental capacity to inflict intentional
harm. When an eleven-year-old caps a record of twenty-three felonies
by murdering another child in cold blood at the direction of his gang,
it calls into serious question our assumption that all children can be
redeemed from a life of crime and, whatever they have done and with
whatever intent, should be treated rather than punished. 5 2 And when
50 Id.
51 Perhaps the single largest generator of public concern was a series of school
shootings that took place in the late 1990s. Most of the shootings involved adolescent
males, and some involved even younger children. See, e.g., Juvenile Violence Time Line,
WASH. PosT ONLINE, 2000, http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/long
term/juvmurders/timeline.htm (recounting (among others) the murders committed
at school by fourteen-year-old Barry Loukaitis in 1996; sixteen-year-old Luke Woodham and fourteen-year-old Michael Carneal in 1997; thirteen-year-old Mitchell johnson, eleven-year-old Andrew Golden, fourteen-year-old Andrew Wurst, eighteen-yearold Jacob Davis, fifteen-year-old Kipland Kinkel, and fourteen-year-old Quinshawn
Booker in 1998; eighteen-year-old Eric Harris and seventeen-year-old Dylan Klebold at
Columbine High School in 1999).
52 The case is that of Robert ''Yummy" Sandifer, as described in PAUL H. RoBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw CAsE STUDIES 135 (2d ed. 2002) ("By age 11, [Yummy Sandifer]
has compiled rap sheet of28 crimes, all but five ofwhich are felonies."). Robinson's
account goes on to describe the murders of sixteen-year-old Kianta Britten and fourteen-year-old Shavon Dean, by eleven-year-old Sandifer at the direction of his gang.
ld. Also consider the Michigan case of eleven-year-old Nathaniel Abraham, who was
tried and convicted as an adult for a 1997 murder which he committed by shooting
his victim while perched in a tree. Before the murder, Nathaniel "was already a suspect in nearly two dozen crimes, including burglary, larceny, home invasion, arson,
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such events repeatedly contradict our assumptions about culpability, it
is hardly surprising if the public, and the lawmakers it elects, begin to
question the accuracy of those assumptions.
It is not only legislators' punitive response to horrific acts by children that should hold our attention; it is the revelation, graphically
and unarguably revealed by this change in laws, that the two rationales
which have supported the juvenile justice system for more than a century may well be dead wrong. That is the reality to which the law has
responded by expanding juvenile liability for crime.
But even conceding the above, the law's punitive response is not
the only possible one. For those many citizens who favor a robust theory of criminal responsibility but also cringe at the idea of sending a
six-year-old to prison no matter what (s)he has done, the collapse of
the traditional rationales for excusing juveniles offers an invaluable
chance to test out the intuition that children should, nonetheless, be
excused from criminal responsibility. Can that intuition still be justified, and if so, on what basis?
If the argument in this Article is correct, a valid basis for a categorical "youth excuse" will not be found in the rubrics of difference,
redemptive potential, or lack of mental capacity. In Part III, I suggest
a new and different justification-one that is grounded not in behavioral or brain differences but in the law's own treatment of, and consequent obligation toward, all children.
I.

BRANDON

T.

AND THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL REsPONSIBILI'IY

Suppose that when you first read the description of the attack on
Ignacio Bermudez you agreed that the perpetrator was guilty of a serious crime, that the charge of attempted murder seemed appropriate
in the case. How did you then react when you read that Brandon was
six years old at the time of the attack? Was your reaction the same as
that of Harold Jewett, the California prosecutor who brought the attempted murder charge against Brandon? "It doesn't matter whether
you're 6 or you're 106," said Jewett in an interview. 5 3 "If you do something that hurts someone else, with knowledge of the wrongfulness of
it, you're responsible for it, period." 54 Or did the single fact of Brandon's age make you hesitate? If the latter, why? Did Brandon's age
give you pause because you think it should matter to his criminal liability; or because you think that regardless of liability he should not be
threatening classmates, beating two teenagers with metal pipes, and snatching a woman's purse at gunpoint.n Beresford, supra note 14, at 785 n.9.
53 Frontline: Little Criminals, supra note 12.
54 /d.

2006]

PUNISHING CHILDREN IN THE CRIMINAL LAW

443

criminally punished; or for some other, independent reason? This
Part addresses the first possibility, which I call the Liability Thesis.

A.

The Liability Thesis: Mens Rea in Children

One reason offered in favor of exempting children from criminal
liability is that they lack the capacity to be mentally culpable. 55 Young
children in particular, according to this argument, are not capable of
forming the requisite intent, or mens rea, to be responsible even for
their otherwise criminal acts. This view has a long history. Even
before the creation of separate juvenile courts in the late-nineteenth
century, children younger than seven at the time of their acts were
treated as not responsible for crime, largely on the theory that young
children lack the capacity to form mens rea, or culpable intent. 56 The
assumption that juveniles lack the requisite mens rea for criminal responsibility was also a core reason for removing them from the criminal justice system entirely and creating a separate, non-punitive
adjudication structure for dealing with juvenile crime. 57 But what
does it mean to say that a person lacks the capacity to form mens rea?
To answer that we need to work from a theory of what mens rea is and
what capacities it requires.

55 See Morse, supra note 31, at 52.
56 For example, consider the seventeenth-century writings of Sir Matthew Hale
on the use of the insanity defense in England.
(Hale] assigned or withheld legal accountability for criminal activity according to whether or not the child was doli capax-possessed of the intelligence
and comprehension to form the blameworthy intent necessary for the commission of a crime. Under the age-based system of classification [devised by
Hale], a child under seven was termed infantia, by definition doli incapax
and barred from prosecution for a criminal offense.
Bazelon, supra note 13, at 168-70. Andrew Walkover traces this idea back to the common law and notes that "[a]t common law the infancy defense was grounded in an
unwillingness to punish individuals incapable of forming criminal intent and thus
incapable of assuming responsibility for their acts.~ Andrew Walkover, The Infancy
Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REv. 503, 512 (1984). See generally
Bazelon, supra note 13, at 190 (arguing that the same standard should apply today to
juvenile offenders who were under age seven at the time of their otherwise criminal
behavior).
57 See, e.g., Stephen Bates Billick, Developmental Competency, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 301, 302 (1986) ("The founding premise of the juvenile justice system was thatjuveniles were incompetent to commit crimes with the same intent as
adults because of maturational immaturity .... ").
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The Elements of Criminal Responsibility

1.

Criminal law doctrine affords two routes to understanding the elements of responsibility. The first focuses on what the state must
prove to show mental culpability in a criminal trial; the second assumes that the state can prove the elements of a crime, 5 8 and outlines
conditions under which the defendant might nonetheless argue in
favor of exculpation. 5 9
The first route is fairly straightforward. To make out a prima facie case the state must show that the defendant did the act which
caused the originally prohibited harm, and that at the time of the act,
the defendant possessed the requisite mental state for commission of
the crime. The Model Penal Code sets out four standards of mental
culpability-conscious purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.60 Thus, if the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant had the conscious purpose at the time of doing the acts
he's charged with doing and of causing the harm he caused, then the
state has proven mens rea. 61 Where defendant lacks such intent (either because he has no capacity to form intent, or for some other
reason), and such intent is a required element of the crime with
which (s)he is charged, (s)he has a defense "on the elements," which
is another way of saying that the state's case will fail for lack of mens
rea. 62
But even when the state has demonstrated that the defendant
committed the act with criminal "intent," the defendant may nonetheless avoid liability if he or she can successfully advance an affirmative
excuse or justification. 63 The premise of a justification defense is that
although the defendant's behavior normally would violate the law, the
58

See, e.g., Robert E. Shepard, Jr., juvenile justice: Rebirth of the Infancy Defense,
Summer 1997, at 45, 45 ("[Most states have) greatly liberalized the ability
of the state to try juveniles as adults.").
59 MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.01 (1962).
60 /d. § 2.02. A fifth standard, of strict liability, eliminates the mens rea requirement for some (minor) crimes. See id. § 2.05.
61 Jd. Under Model Penal Code section 2.02(5), higher levels of mens rea suffice
to prove lower levels. Thus,
[w] hen the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of
an offense, such element also is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such
element also is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When
acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely.
ld.
62 See id. § 2.02(j).
63 See id. §§ 3.01-.04, 4.01.
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defendant did the right thing in the particular situation facing him or
her. The paradigmatic case for justification is self-defense-the defendant acknowledges that he intentionally killed the victim under circumstances in which defendant reasonably believed that the victim
presented an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury. 6 4 In
that situation (and assuming defendant's claim can be proven), we say
that the defendant's act was justified, that it was the right thing to do
under the circumstances. 65
The other form of affirmative defense is excuse. When defendant lays claim to an excuse she acknowledges that (1) the state can
prove mens rea (as well as causation and actus reus), and that (2)
what she did was wrong-her behavior cannot be justified under the
law. 66 Nevertheless, defendant asks to be exonerated from criminal
responsibility on the grounds of some personal defect or lack of capacity that would render it unjust to convict her of a crime. The paradigm here is the excuse of insanity, on the Model Penal Code's
definition of which defendant may escape criminal liability if, (1) as a
result of a mental disease or defect, (2) Defendant lacks "substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." 67 Notice
that this suggests the necessity of certain threshold capacities-to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's act, and to have the ability to control one's conduct to the extent of complying with the law-before
criminal liability may be imposed. In addition, the affirmative excuse
of duress illuminates the law's assumption that persons guilty of a
crime have acted voluntarily and not under coercion by another
person. 68

64 See, e.g., id. § 3.04(2) (b) ("The use of deadly force is not justifiable ... unless
the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious
bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat .... ").
65 See also id. § 3.02 (explaining that the harm or evil sought to be avoided by
such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged).
66 See, e.g., id. §§ 2.04, 2.08, 4.00 (discussing the excuses of ignorance, mistake,
intoxication, and mental disease).
67 Id. § 4.01.
68 See, e.g., id. § 2.09 ("It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the
conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use
of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another,
which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to
resist.").
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2.

Do Children as a Class Lack the Capacities Required for
Criminal Liability?
a.

Brandon T. and Threshold Culpability

If the above discussion is correct, the law assumes the presence of
three threshold capacities when a person is charged with a crime.
These are ( 1) instrumental rationality, which in turn requires the capacity to form the conscious purpose to do a thing, to correlate that
intent with actions capable of achieving it, and to follow through by
performing those actions which cause the criminal harm; 69 (2) the
capacity to understand the difference between acting rightfully and
acting wrongfully; and (3) the capacity to refrain from acting wrongfully which essentially assumes that defendant did not act under overpowering compulsion (from inside or outside) that left him with no
choice but to do wrong.
Is it true that, as a class and by definition, children lack the
threshold level of these capacities required for criminal liability? Consider, again, the case of Brandon T. Evidence in that case indicated
that Brandon ( 1) held a grudge against the parents of Ignacio
Bermudez; (2) determined to kill Ignacio in order to revenge himself
on the baby's parents for "harassing him;" (3) recruited accomplices;
(4) waited until Ignacio's parents were out of the house; and (5) went
to the baby's room where he brutally beat Ignacio, inflicting enormous and irreparable damage. 70 Mter the attack, Brandon T. (1)
stole a very popular "Big Wheel" tricycle from the Bermudez house;
(2) warned a potential witness, a little girl, "You better not tell anybody what I did;" (3) initially lied to police by saying that he didn't do
it; and ( 4) eventually confessed and reenacted the entire event on
videotape. 71
It seems clear from the facts that at the time he attacked Ignacio
Bermudez, Brandon T. (1) intended to perform the acts that harmed
Ignacio (he did not accidentally knock the baby out of its bassinet; he
intentionally threw the baby on the floor); (2) did those intentional
actions with the conscious purpose of harming the baby (when he
took the baby out of the bassinet and dropped him, he did not think
that Ignacio would fly out of the room; he knew the baby would fall to
the floor and that the fall would harm him); (3) knew that if he were
caught by authorities he would get into trouble; and ( 4) took precau69 See Morse, supra note 31, at 25 (reasoning that rationality is the ability to perceive accurately and reason instrumentally); infra text accompanying notes 87-90.
70 Beck, supra note 1.
71 !d.
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tions to prevent this from happening. On its face, Brandon's act was
intentional and premeditated-not compelled or coerced-and the
acts were done with the knowledge that if he were caught he would
probably be punished.
b.

Competence, Character, and Autonomy

From the perspective of criminal liability, is anything m1ssmg
from this picture? Consider the following argument: Both the elements (actus reus and mens rea) and the affirmative defenses (which
can exculpate despite the undisputed existence of the elements) assume, and proceed from, a background standard that not only dictates the doctrinal content of the existing grounds for exculpation but
also offers an independent basis for gauging the responsibility (or
non-responsibility) of particular defendants or group of defendants.
In the context of juvenile responsibility for crime, Professor Stephen
Morse has applied the standard of "normative competence." 72 Professor Morse describes normative competence as "the most ... important
prerequisite to being morally responsible" 73 and defines it as "the general capacity to understand and be guided by the reasons that support
a moral prohibition we accept." 74 An agent is normatively incompetent (and thus not morally responsible) when he or she "either ... is
unable rationally to comprehend the facts that bear on the morality of
his action or is unable rationally to comprehend the applicable moral
or legal code." 75 Rationality, in turn,
is the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right, and to
reason instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately
and according to a minimally coherent preference-ordering. Put
yet another way, it is the ability to act for good reasons and it is
always a good reason not to act (or to act) if doing so (or not doing
so) will be wrong. 7 6
Morse, supra note 31, at 24.
!d. at 24-25.
74 Id. at 25.
75 Id.
76 !d. Notice that, on Morse's view, it is not necessary that the defendant acted
for good, generalizable reasons at the time of the crime. Most offenders presumably
do not or they would not have offended. The general nonnative capacity to be able
to grasp and be guided by reason is sufficient. Professor Morse includes within his
conception of normative competence the requirement of empathy-in his view a defendant who lacks "the ability to empathize and to feel guilt or some other reflexive
reactive emotion" lacks normative competence and should not be criminally responsible. ld. at 26. AB Morse acknowledges, this requirement is not now a feature of the
actual criminal law-the lack of a conscience is not a valid basis for being excused
from criminal liability.
72
73
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Professor Morse seems to propose normative competence as a background standard against which the criminal liability of all defendants,
including adolescent defendants, can validly be measured. 77
But Morse makes it clear that he considers pre-adolescent children to be normatively incompetent because of their age. He argues
that since young children "lack many of the necessary attributes of
rationality" and "infrequendy commit serious crimes, ... the issue of
full or substantial responsibility is not seriously in contention for
young children." 78 Morse simply concludes, without analysis, that
young children are by definition normatively incompetent and that
they ought therefore to be excluded from criminal responsibility as a
class. 79
Why is Brandon T. normatively incompetent under the standard
laid down by Morse? Thinking about this question exposes a perplexing problem with the standard of normative competence itself. Upon
close inspection, the standard quickly becomes maddeningly elusive,
offering no clear solution to the problem of responsibility. Consider
its key terms. To be "normatively competent" (and thus criminally
responsible) a defendant must possess "the general capacity to understand and be guided by the reasons that support a moral prohibition
we accept." 80 The phrase "general capacity" apparently refers to defendant's abilities as demonstrated in his or her everyday behavior,
not necessarily to his or her behavior at the time of the crime. The
question for Morse is does this defendant, in general, possess the "capacity to understand and to be guided by [good] reasons"? 81 If not,
then defendant is not responsible. If so, defendant is responsible, although his behavior at the time of the crime may well have demonstrated that he also has the capacity to understand and be guided by
bad reasons. 82
But how ought one to apply this standard? To a large degree-as
Morse acknowledges-the judgments of rationality and normative
competence in any particular case will rest on moral and political intuitions that must remain contingent and debatable. 83 "Nonetheless,"
77 ld. at 25.
78 ld.
79 ld.
80
81
82

ld.
ld. at 24-25.
ld. at 25-26.
83 !d. at 25 ("What is the content of rationality that responsibility requires? As
part of the normative, socially constructed practice of blaming, there cannot be a selfdefining answer. A normative, moral and political judgment concerning the content
and degree of rationality is necessary.").
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he argues, "some guid[ance] is possible," 84 and it would seem that
some definition of the basic terms in the standard is necessary in order for it to have any content at all.
Consider that in assessing culpability the law generally looks to
what a defendant was thinking, to his or her mental state at the time
of the act, not to the defendant's capacities outside of that time frame.
If the defendant was delusional and killed someone because of a delusion, then (s)he should presumably be excused. If not, not. In many
or most such cases, the defendant will turn out to have pre-existing
mental and/ or emotional difficulties, and to the extent these have
been documented and can be presented at trial, such facts may add
credence to the defendant's claim that (s)he was delusional at the
time of the act. But, for example, if defendant has long been paranoid schizophrenic but kills someone for a wrongful, but non-delusional, reason, this is no excuse although defendant's mental illness
may, in general, affect his or her ability to understand and obey the
law. 85 Conversely, if defendant in general has the capacity to understand and obey the law but became delusional in this case, the defendant should, presumably, be excused and (evidentiary issues aside)
the relevance of his or her general capacities is, at best, unclear.
Second, what does it mean to say that a defendant has, or does
not have, the "capacity to understand and to be guided by [good]
reasons"? 86 On Morse's view, rationality is the key. Rational comprehension involves "the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts
right, and to reason instrumentally, i~cluding weighing the facts appropriately and according to a minimally coherent preference-ordering."87 Fine. But again, what does this mean? What does it mean to
say that a defendant possesses the general ability to perceive accurately
(to perceive what accurately?); to get the facts right (which facts?); and
to reason instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately?
(Appropriately? Again, which facts, and according to what conception
of appropriateness?) On what basis do we decide that a defendant has
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006). Eric Clark was a paranoid
schizophrenic who was found guilty of first degree murder. After announcing to
classmates that he wanted to kill a police officer, Clark drove a pickup truck at dawn
to a neighborhood near his home, then blared the radio while circling the block.
When Officer Jeffrey Moritz responded to calls by the residents, Clark shot him dead.
Announcing his verdict of guilty to murder, the judge at Clark's bench trial took note
of the fact that, although he had allowed Clark to present evidence directly connecting his admitted paranoid schizophrenia to the killing of the police officer, no such
evidence had been presented. Id. at 2716-18.
86 Morse, supra note 31, at 24-25.
87 Id. at 25.
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these general abilities, when (s)he has been accused of an act that
seems to demonstrate their absence? Answers to such questions are
key to understanding how the standard would work out in particular
cases.
Now consider the standard of normative competence as applied
to the case of Brandon T. In Morse's view, the law, in deciding
whether or not Brandon T. is criminally responsible, looks to his general capacity for rationality. 88 Does Brandon T., in general, possess
"the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right, and to reason
instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately and according to a minimally coherent preference-ordering?" 89 According to
Morse, a defendant may possess these capacities-and thus be
deemed responsible for purposes of the criminal law-although (s)he
failed to demonstrate them at the time of his or her alleged criminal
actY 0 But consider, in this respect, the capacities Brandon T. did
demonstrate in his attack on Ignacio. Motivated by his desire to hurt
Mr. and Mrs. Bermudez, 91 Brandon T. accurately perceived that harming Ignacio would injure his parents; devised a plan under which he
could gain access to the baby; waited for the right moment (when
Ignacio's parents were not present) to carry out the plan; and after
successfully putting the plan into action, took steps to avoid what he
knew would be the unpleasant consequences of getting caught. 92 In
short, Brandon T. clearly demonstrated instrumental rationality,
knowledge of wrongfulness, a quite sophisticated knowledge of how to
cause pain to one's enemies, and the executive capacity to unite his
desire for revenge on Ignacio's parents with a plan that successfully
put that desire into effect. Given what seems to be a powerful case in
favor of holding Brandon responsible, the burden shifts here-why,
despite these facts, should he not be criminally responsible?
Despite Brandon T.'s demonstrated abilities to perceive accurately, reason instrumentally, and assess the facts and situation appropriately (given the end he had in view), perhaps one might argue that
88 See id. at 24-25.
89 ld.
90 ld. at 25-26.
91 The desire alone, Morse concedes, does not prove Brandon's irrationality. See,
e.g., id. at 27 ("[E]ven if desires can be construed as irrational, irrational desires do
not deprive the agent of nonnative competence unless they somehow disable the rational capacities just addressed or they produce an internal hard choice situation distinguishable from the choices experienced by people with equally strong, rational
desires."). Neither of these exceptions would seem to apply to cases such as that of
Brandon T.
92 See Beck, supra note 1.
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Brandon T. nonetheless lacked "the ability to act for good reason"
that is requisite to a finding of normative competence.93 One could
attempt this conclusion in two ways. First, one might import a component of virtue into one's conception of rationality by arguing, for example, that key terms in the definition of normative competencesuch as "accurately" and "appropriately"-refer not merely to defendant's ability to recognize his preferences and to take action that maximizes the likelihood those preferences will be realized, but go also to
the merits of those preferences-perceiving "accurately" means perceiving that hurting a baby is a monstrous thing to do, and weighing
the facts "appropriately" means (for example) putting less weight on
one's grudge against the Bermudez family than on the probable harm
one will cause by beating their child. In short, the standard might
require that defendant possess a recognizable moral code as well as
the threshold mental capacity to identify and effectively to act upon
his preferences. The capacity "to understand and be guided by good ...
reason[s]" necessarily implies that defendant has accepted those reasons and has the mental wherewithal to apply them, in general, to his
decisions. 94
But this version of the standard would work very troubling
changes on the criminal law. Consider the virtue-based standard as
applied to three defendants, Dl-D3. By hypothesis Dl has the general capacity to understand and be guided by the reasons that support
moral/legal prohibitions, which means that (s)he has accepted the
relevance of such reasons and can, in general, apply them in making
decisions. D2 and D3lack the general capacity to understand and be
guided by good reason, but the lack takes two different forms: (a) D2
is legally insane, while (b) D3 has consciously rejected good in favor of
evil-for example DJlacks the capacity for empathy and remorse, and
without those threshold capacities DJ is unable to understand or be
guided by good reason. 95
Now consider the relative criminal liability of Ds 1-3 under the
virtue-based version of normative competence. Dl, the defendant
93 Morse, supra note 31, at 25.
94 ld. at 23 (emphasis added).
95 In theory we might imagine two subspecies of D3, DJ(a) and D3(b). One can
coherently imagine DJ(a), who once possessed the capacity for empathy and remorse,
but made the choice to suppress them in order to acquire wealth, position, or power.
For the purposes of moral evaluation such a defendant might merit different treatment than DJ(b), who lacks empathic ability but may or may not have adopted affirmatively evil values. However, in the case of a D whose lack of empathy, however
acquired, leads him or her to commit violent offenses against innocent others, Ds 3(a)
and 3(b) may be functionally identical for the purposes of the criminal law.
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who possesses and (in general) displays the capacity to be guided by
good reasons is criminally responsible although the crime (s) he committed presumably failed to demonstrate such capacity. If D2 is insane, (s) he merits an excuse under the virtue-based standard, and this
result is entirely uncontroversial. In that situation the standard adds
nothing to existing doctrine or to the particular debate over juvenile
responsibility under the law. 96 But Morse would go much farther,
mandating that D3 must also be excused. 97 And this is what makes the
virtue based standard so troubling. Dl, the defendant who in general
has the capacity to act on good reasons because (in part) (s)he accepts the moral standards they represent, is criminally responsible.
D3, who does not accept the good reasons supporting the moral
prohibitions of the law because his lack of empathic ability has deprived him of a conscience (and he therefore lacks an internal counterbalance to his violent and evil desires) and therefore lacks the
"capacity" to understand and be guided by them, is not criminally responsible under the virtue-based conception.
The standard of normative competence represents Professor
Morse's attempt to lay out a proper basis for evaluating the blameworthiness of all defendants. 98 He must be saying, therefore, that D3 is
less blameworthy for his or her criminal actions than is Dl. But this
seems wrong. Suppose that Ds 1 and 3 are charged with intentional
murder. Dl understands and accepts that killing is wrong, but allowed her intense hatred of a particular victim, Vl, to overcome that
moral prohibition. D3 raped V3 because he felt like it, and then
killed her in order to prevent her from testifYing against him for the
rape. On what grounds could we plausibly conclude that D3 is less
blameworthy for his actions than DJ? 99
96 Presumably everyone agrees that where a juvenile defendant is legally insane
that defendant, like any other defendant, merits an excuse. The debate about juvenile liability concerns cases in which the defendant is concededly not insane but is
nevertheless developmentally different from adults in various ways deemed relevant.
On the ultimate relevance of such differences to the law, see infra text accompanying
notes 127-30.
97 Morse, supra note 31, at 26 ("After much thought, I have come to the conclusion that normative competence should require the ability to empathize and to feel
guilt or some other reflexive reactive emotion.").
98 See, e.g., supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
99 Indeed, an initial intuition might be that Dl is clearly less culpable than the
others, since almost by definition he would seem to lack the ability to do the kind of
deliberate and premeditated murder that DJ might commit. Dl's capacity to commit
such a murder has in fact been defined away by the virtue standard; the most serious
form of homicide of which Dl would appear capable would be one in which his moral
restraint is overcome by a strong emotion such as rage or fear-and thus becomes the
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This seems to be where Morse's normative requirement of empathic ability comes in. A second, and potentially related, way of finding Brandon T. to be normatively incompetent would be to add a
requirement of empathic ability to the responsibility standard. Morse
might argue, for example, that D3 should be excused from criminal
responsibility on grounds of fairness because the lack of capacity to
feel empathy and remorse makes DJ "not amenable to reason." 100
This does seem to be a key link, in Morse's mind, between responsibility in general and responsibility in children. 101
Since Professor Morse acknowledges that psychopathy is not in
fact a basis for excuse under the criminal law as it exists, 10 2 Morse's
empathy argument expressly moves the discussion from the descriptive to the prescriptive. And the prescription seems profoundly
wrong. The result of making empathetic capacity a necessary component of normative competence would be that those offenders, like D3,
who lack remorse and fellow feeling would be excused from criminal
liability and punishment on those grounds. And this would be a pernicious result, for at least three reasons.
First, while it seems to be the case that many violent criminals are
psychopaths, it is not the case that all psychopaths are criminals. Indeed, recent evidence indicates that psychopaths exist in all walks of
life, many quite legal.1°3 If such research is true, it may well be the
possible basis for a partial excuse due to provocation or extreme emotional
disturbance.
100 Morse, supra note 31, at 26 ("Perhaps people who lack the capacity for empathy and guilt-the so-called 'psychopaths'-are particularly immoral and deserve special condemnation rather than excuse, but this does not seem fair. To the best of our
knowledge, some harmdoers simply lack these capacities and they are not amenable
to reason. They may be dangerous people, but they are not part of our moral community."); see also MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 4.01 (2) (1962) ("A person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mutual disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.").
101 Professor Morse identifies the capacity for empathy as a "critical distinguishing
variable" and argues that if adolescents "lack the general capacity for empathy that is a
component of full moral agency ... then adolescents as a class may be less responsible
moral agents in general and might deserve mitigation, if not full exoneration."
Morse, supra note 31, at 60. Morse goes on to acknowledge, however, that the law
does not excuse (adult) psychopaths on grounds of their lack of empathy. !d. at 61.
"On my theory of responsibility," he adds, "such people should be excused and I wish
to proceed as if the law followed." !d.
102 !d. at 60-61.
103 See, e.g., Belinda jane Board & Katarina Fritzon, Disordered Personalities at Work,
11 PsvcHOL., CRIME & L. 17, 18-25 (2005) (comparing personality traits of successful
business managers and patients at Broadmoor Hospital, one of Britain's highest se-
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case that most psychopaths-that is, most people who lack the capacity to feel empathy and remorse-demonstrate both the inclination
and the capacity to stay on the right side of the law. Since, by definition, they do not obey the law because they respect other people or
because breaking the law would make them feel guilty, presumably
they obey it for other reasons. Among those reasons are the costs associated with being criminally prosecuted and punished for committing a crime. Excusing psychopaths from criminal punishment would
dramatically reduce the strength of this disincentive, and therefore
dramatically reduce the psychopath's interest in remaining lawabiding.
Professor Morse's argument focuses more on the deontological
bases for punishment-the question of whether defendant deserves
punishment or not-than on utilitarian ones. But the point is important because it suggests that the common view of psychopathy and its
relationship to crime is quite impoverished. We often discuss psychopaths as though their deficits-in the capacities for empathy and remorse-constitute a sufficient explanation of their criminal misdeeds.
But this is in fact a highly debatable assumption. Consider a psychopathic killer like Ted Bundy, who was executed in Florida in 1989 after confessing to the murders of more than thirty women. 104 In the
public mind, Bundy has come to symbolize the psychopath, a person
who is relentlessly self-focused, manipulative, and incapable of empathy or remorse. But these deficits by themselves are not a sufficient
explanation of Bundy's murderous career. Again, most psychopaths
(if pyschopathy is defined this way) do not commit violent crimes, 105
and most certainly do not travel coast to coast for the purpose of murdering women. What explains the difference between Bundy and the
law-abiding psychopath is not the absence of empathy and remorse,
curity hospitals). Business managers scored higher than patients on measures of histrionic, narcissistic and compulsive personality; such traits are thought to reflect
psychopathic characteristics such as superficial charm, lack of empathy, and perfectionism. Id. at 25. Unlike the Broadmoor patients, the business managers scored
lower on antisocial, borderline, and paranoid personality traits, indicating lower levels
of aggression, impulsivity, and mistrust. Id. The authors suggest that the business
managers may be examples of "' [s)uccessful psychopaths ... people with psychopathic [personality disorder] patterns, but without the characteristic history of arrest
and incarceration." Jd. at 18-19 (quoting Donald R. Lynam et al., Self-Reported Psychopathy: A Validation Study, 73 J. PERSONAL11Y AssESSMENT llO, Ill (1999)).
104 John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL
CaNST. LJ. 483, 486 n.5 (1996).
105 See Board & Fritzon, supra note 103, at 18-19 (noting growing empirical research into "successful" psychopaths who avoid arrest and incarceration).
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but that absence combined with the presence of the desires to hurt, kill, and
do other kinds of serious harm to people. What prompted Bundy to kill was
not the mere absence of empathy for his victims or anticipatory remorse for killing them; but the absence of those things combined with
the presence of the desire to kill women. Most people, whether psychopaths
or not, do not have this desire. Bundy deserved criminal punishment
not because he was a psychopath but because he possessed the affirmative intent to, and did, commit murder, while recognizing that the
acts he did were blameworthy and would be condemned by society.
It may of course be true that lack of empathic ability makes it
more difficult for a psychopath to obey the law, in the sense that one
barrier to law-breaking-what we call "conscience"-is missing from
the psychopath's mental toolkit. But, as Morse acknowledges, the fact
that some people find it more difficult to obey the law than others is
not, and should not be, valid grounds for an excuse from criminal
responsibility. 106 The criminal law is properly indifferent to such
claims. A defendant will not be heard to argue that he should be
excused for an otherwise criminal action because he has a very impulsive temperament; because he is quick to anger and has a strong tendency toward violent expression of his rage; or, even because he
suffered an abused and loveless childhood and never learned to treat
others with care and respect. Yet all of these things can make it more
difficult-in many cases much more difficult-for defendants to resist
their desire to harm. Why is lack of a conscience different in kind
from these other character and personality defects, such that the particular defect of lack of empathy should be singled out as the basis for
excuse and these other lacks may not? Considering the very great
harm of which psychopathic criminals are capable and that they do, in
fact, inflict on society, more thought must be given to these questions
before legally sane psychopaths are excused from criminal
responsibility.
Nor is such an excuse necessarily implied by the normative competence standard itself. One could make a quite compelling argument that Ted Bundy easily met the standard-that he possessed, and
consistently demonstrated, the "ability to perceive accurately, to get
the facts right, and to reason instrumentally, including weighing the
106 Morse, supra note 31, at 28 ("Those who are fortunate enough to be especially
brave and those who are of average braveness will be able to meet [the standard of
normative competence] quite readily. Those who are of less than average dispositional firmness will have more trouble resisting when they should. Still, if we judge
that the person had the general capacity to comply with the reasonable firmness standard, even if it is harder for her than most, then she will be held responsible if she
yields when a person of reasonable firmness would have resisted.").
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facts appropriately and according to a minimally coherent preference
ordering." 107
Thus, the standard of normative competence offers no clear and
valid basis on which to excuse Brandon T. from criminal responsibility. And Morse's proposal to make responsibility dependant on the
capacity for empathy would produce the untenable and unwarranted
result that the most dangerous, violent, and evil-minded criminals
among us would be excused from responsibility for their criminal
actions.
But what if children as a group lack empathiccapacity, or have
less of it than adults? Shouldn't such a (temporary) disability absolve,
or at least reduce, their liability for crime, on the grounds that this
lack makes it more. difficult for them to obey the law? As a normative
matter this is an interesting question-but it requires an additional
argument explaining why children should be excused on those
grounds although adults possessing the same defect are not. Beyond
that, and as a descriptive matter, it strikes me as quite implausible to
say that children, even children as young as six, lack a threshold level
of empathy as a group. The vast majority of children do not attempt
to murder other people, and recent evidence indicates that those who
do are both quite rare and are much more likely than other children
to become psychopaths and/or lifelong criminal offenders. 108 To the
extent that refraining from doing violent harm to others requires
some threshold level of empathy, the burden of proof should be
placed on those who would claim that children as a group lack this
quality.
B.

The Relevance of Facts and Contact

But perhaps the above moves too quickly. Even on a minimalist
account such as the one offered here, it must be true that criminal
responsibility requires some understanding of at least certain facts
and context. After all, the mens rea of conscious purpose requires
that the defendant understand and intend the probable consequences
of his actions. 109 Homicide, for example, is often defined by state statute as the "unlawful killing of a human being." 110 In a homicide case,
107 I d. at 25.
lOB See infra notes 159-61.
109 MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 2.02(2) (a) (1962) ("A person acts purposely with respect
to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the dement involves the nature of his
conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result .... ").
llO See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 187(a) (West 1999).
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a defendant cannot be guilty of murder or attempted murder unless
he or she understood, at the time of the killing, what it means for a
person to die. If a defendant really believes that when you kill someone they come back to life the next day, it would be wrong to hold
him guilty of murder or attempted murder since he doesn't comprehend an essential fact about the harm resulting from his purpose and
his actions. At a minimum, understanding the "essential facts" about
killing someone requires the knowledge that when someone dies they
are gone for good. The younger children are, the less likely they are
to understand such facts, and-the argument might go-this lack of
understanding should render young children non-culpable for homicide or attempted homicide.
In the case of Brandon T., the evidence conflicted on the question of whether he understood what it means to kill or to die. On the
one hand, Brandon's own father had been murdered when the child
was four. Brandon knew that his father had died violently and the
child was given to fantasizing about the event. 111 On the other hand,
Brandon's defense attorney and at least one court appointed expert
concluded that the boy did not understand what it meant to kill a
person, and on the basis of those opinions the court ultimately
amended the criminal charge from attempted murder to assault with
intent to commit bodily harm. 112 Thus, the case offers no convincing
111 Frontline: Little Criminals, supra note 12 (interviewing Brandon T.'s defense attomey, John Burris).
112 I d.; see alsoCurtius, supra note 6 (describing how "(t]he case faded from public
view only after a Juvenile Court referee ruled that the assailant could not understand
his offense"). It is noteworthy, however, that psychiatrist Martin Blinder, one of three
mental health professionals who interviewed Brandon T. in order to evaluate his competency, found the boy competent to stand trial. In an interview with Frontline, Dr.
Blinder described the process by which he reached that decision:
I must say, in truth, I was surprised after I completed my assessment to
find the 6-year-old competent. My bias going in was, "This is ridiculous.
How can a 6-year-old be competent to stand trial? How could he have even
understood what he was doing, no less what a trial is all about?" But the kids
watch television and they watch the cop shows and they watch the lawyer
shows and they have-they may not watch them like they watch "Sesame
Street," but kids are tremendously aware these days. So this kid certainly was
aware that he was in deep trouble and that there were certain procedures
that were likely to befall him.
He understood that society considered what he had done wrong, which
is why he was being locked up at juvenile hall. He knew the judge's task. He
knew his lawyer was there to help him. He knew the prosecutor was going to
gather the evidence against him. And he understood that if things didn't go
his way, he might not go home to see his mommy for a long, long time. So
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argument that six-year-olds as a class must be exempted from liability
for homicide. The question of exemption hinges on the answer to the
prior question of what exactly a defendant must know about death
and about killing before he or she may be criminally blamed for a
homicide. At a minimum, it seems clear that defendant must understand some things about the nature of the harm (s)he inflicted: that
killing someone causes their permanent departure, perhaps. On such
a threshold view defendant is chargeable if (s)he (1) understands that
killing someone ends their life, which means at least that he or she is
gone forever, and (2) that society considers this wrong.
The discussion thus far should alert us to the presence of a
broader issue. As a general matter, we might hypothesize that a person may be found criminally responsible only if (s)he understands the
facts requisite to the harm that motivates the criminal prohibition
(s)he is charged with violating. Thus, murder is criminally prohibited
because killing someone removes the person permanently from the
world and this inflicts a terrible and irreparable loss, not only on the
person killed but also on those attached to and/ or dependent on that
person. Defendant must at least understand ( 1) the fact of the injury,
(2) its permanence, and (3) that inflicting this loss is considered
wrong. There was some evidence that Brandon T. did in fact understand all these things, and under such a standard he could therefore
be held responsible.
It is of course possible to embellish the theory in a way that would
exclude more, or all children from liability, but doing so would necessitate a comparison with the standards of criminal responsibility as applied to defendants generally. One could argue, for example, that in
order to be held liable for homicide a defendant must know not only
that killing someone is considered wrong and that it removes the person permanently, but that doing this violates rights possessed by the
victim, specifically the right not to be murdered. On this theory it
might well make sense to exempt many or all pre-adolescent children
(certainly children as young as Brandon T.) from liability for homicide on the ground that they are unlikely to understand the process of
and the effect of a victim's death, and are also unlikely to comprehend what a "right" is and why society might enforce it. But quite
clearly we do not apply this richer standard when an adult defendant
is charged with homicide. Suppose adult defendant AD is charged
with murder and there is no doubt that AD did the acts that caused
despite his juvenility, I felt that he grasped the essentials of what a trial proceeding was, why he was going to be tried and what the penalties might be.
Frontline: Little Criminals, supra note 12.
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the victim's ( V) death. AD could not defend the murder charge on
the ground ( 1) that although his killing of V means that V is gone
from the earth and will not return, Vis now in Heaven living with God
and therefore AD's action was justified because he actually conferred
a net benefit on V; or on the ground (2) of AD's (genuine) belief that
people do not, in fact, have a "right" to life or even a right not to be
arbitrarily killed-their continued existence depends solely on their
ability to defend themselves against any and all attacks by others. For
the purpose of prosecuting AD for murder, it would simply not matter
how sincere or well-documented AD's belief in the afterlife, or in the
law of the jungle, happened to be-the law does not inquire, or admit
into its official inquiry, the details of defendant's beliefs in death unless those beliefs are otherwise relevant to an already existing excuse
such as insanity. Needless to say, neither of the beliefs described
above would alone merit such an excuse.
C.

Other Differences as Basis for the Youth Excuse

Some would argue that whatever the evidence in favor of finding
intent, there are other differences in cognitive, emotional, and social
capacity between children and adults, and these differences are so
great that it is simply unjust for the criminal law to hold children to
the same standard of behavior as adult._. This argument is the thrust
of much recent scholarship in the area of juvenile culpability.ll 3 In
general, the scholarship focuses on differences between adolescents
and adults, attempting to demonstrate that adolescents are less averse
to risk, more likely to value short-term benefits over long-term costs,
and more likely to be influenced by their social environment than
adults, 114 and that these differences ought to serve either as a complete bar to criminal liability for juveniles, 115 or as a partial bar to such
113 See Brink, supra note 16, at 1557-58; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 801;
Bazelon, supra note 13, at 162.
114 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 812-16; id. at 813 ("[E]ven when
adolescent cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthful decision making
may still differ due to immature judgment. The psycho-social factors most relevant to
differences in judgment include: (a) peer orientation, (b) attitudes toward and perception of risk, (c) temporal perspectives, and (d) capacity for self-management.
While cognitive capacities shape the process of decisionmaking, immature judgment
can affect outcomes because these developmental factors influence adolescent values
and preferences that drive the cost-benefit calculus in the making of choices.").
115 See, e.g., Brink, supra note 16, at 1585 ("The trend to try juveniles as adults is
inconsistent with retributive, rehabilitative, and deterrent rationales for punishment
and with the related rationales for having a separate system of juvenile justice in the
first place. A sound criminal jurisprudence requires that we stop treating juvenile
offenders as little adults.").
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liability. 116 The scholarship usually draws on behavioral studies demonstrating that adolescents as a class have weaker future-orientation
than do adults as a class; that they take more health and safety risks
than do adults as a class; and that they are more impulsive than adults
as a class. 117 These differences, the argument concludes, reduce adolescent blameworthiness and (thus) criminal culpability. us
Most recently this difference-based approach has received a public relations boost from medical technology. To the behavioral studies
demonstrating some differences between adolescents and adults with
respect to things like risk taking and long term focus are now added
studies of brain function that allegedly support those conclusions. Advances in brain imaging technology have allowed researchers to observe the ways in which the brain changes from childhood, through
adolescence, and into adulthood. Studies indicate that the brain matures throughout adolescence, and indeed well into adulthood. 119 In
particular, recent studies suggest that development of the brain's frontal lobe, which is a key factor in regulating impulses in adults, is not
complete until some time after age twenty one. 12°
However, as Professor Morse has correctly pointed out, the legal
relevance of such information is far from clear. 121 First, this very same
brain research indicates that brain maturation peaks at least several
years beyond age eighteen, the legal age of majority. A possible implication of this finding is that the legal age of majority should be raised,
say to twenty-two or twenty-five, by which time the brain is more fully
116 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 800 (advocating "a model under
which immaturity mitigates responsibility-but does not excuse the criminal acts of
youths who are beyond childhood").
117 ld. at 829-30.
118 ld.
119 See, e.g., Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 36, at 324; Lee Bowman, New
Research Shows Stark Differences in Teen Brains, ScRIPPS HowARD NEws SERVICE, May 11,
2004 ("In fact, the brain's gray matter has a final growth spurt around the ages of
eleven to thirteen in the frontal lobes of the brain, the regions that guide human
intellect and planning. But it seems to take most of the teen years for youngsters to
link these new cells to the rest of their brains and solidify the millions of connections
that allow them to think and behave like adults.").
120 For example, consider a study led by Nitin Gogtay of the National Institute of
Men tal Health in which researchers performed magnetic resonance imaging· every
two years on thirteen people between the ages of four and twenty-one. The results
indicated that the frontal lobes of the brain were the last to develop fully, and that the
brain changes continued up to age twenty-one, the oldest age examined. See, e.g.,
Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain, 305 SciENCE 596, 596
(2004).
121 Morse, supra note 48, at 406.
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developed. 122 Even further, the studies now trumpeted as demonstrating "stark differences" between adolescent and adult brains also
show that brain development continues well into a person's forties
and fifties. 1 2 3 At what point in a person's brain development does
(s)he become criminally responsible? The studies themselves cannot
answer that question. Instead, they simply expose us to the truth that
ultimately, criminal responsibility is a matter of moral judgment
rather than of scientific fact-finding. 124 Indeed, many scientists warn
against the use of brain imaging technology to determine moral or
legal culpability. 125 They caution that no existing technology can
prove a causal connection between brain structure and particular behavior, and that imaging should not, therefore, be forced into the service of assigning, or excluding, any particular person from legal
responsibility. 126

122 Beckman, supra note 120, at 596 ("Some say [brain] growth maxes out at
twenty. Others ... consider 25 the age at which brain maturation peaks."); see also
Bowman, supra note 119 (" [S] orne scientists would put off the age of legal majority to
22 or 23.").
123 Bowman, supra note ll9 ("Even in adulthood, the wiring job is not completely
done. Imaging done on the brains of people in their 40s and 50s show there's another surge of connections being made, perhaps in response to menopause or to
prepare the brain to better compensate for the loss of brain cells as we age.").
124 Professor Morse has made the same point. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 20
("[A] legally responsible agent is a person who is so generally capable, according to
some contingent, normative notion both of rationality itself and of how much capability is required .... These are matters of moral, political, and ultimately, legal judgment, about which reasonable people can and do differ.").
125 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 119 (" [R] esearchers say that while it's possible to
gain general understanding about brain development and function from the images,
the notion that medicine, law enforcement or anyone else should work from some
ideal, normal brain model is troubling. 'Each individual is not an exact map, and the
difficulties in determining what the range of variations are is really dangerous. The
data is incredibly easy to be over-interpreted,' said Sonia Miller, a New York attorney
who specializes in cases dealing with new technologies."); see also id. ("Dr. Peter
Bandettini, a brain-imaging researcher at the National Institutes of Health, said the
science of understanding what small structures and chemicals are doing within the
brain is far from a gold standard for mental function or age. 'Right now, I personally
think you'd get more information about a person's mental age by going to a set of
behavioral tests.'").
126 Beckman, supra note 120, at 599 ("'We couldn't do a scan on a kid and decide
if they should be tried as an adult,' [Sowell} says."); see also id. ("Although many researchers agree that the brain, especially the frontal lobe, continues to develop well
into teenhood and beyond, many scientists hesitate to weigh in on the legal debate.
Some, like Uay] Giedd [of the NIMH], say the data 'just aren't there' for them to
confidently testifY to the moral or legal culpability of adolescents in court.").
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The fact of difference does not, by itself, mandate any particular
moral or legal result. As Professor Morse has explained, variations in
ability or behavior between persons do not mandate differences in
legal treatment or responsibility. Differences are only relevant to the
extent that they impact on a pre-existing standard of responsibility.
That standard cannot be dictated by the differences. Instead, the differences must be measured against the standard in order to determine the responsibility of any particular defendant or group of
defendants. 127
Thus, the fact that adolescents and adults may be somewhat different in ways that affect their general judgment and decision-making
capacity does not answer the question of whether adolescents ought to
be held liable for serious crime. Further, as Morse points out:
A substantial minority of adults is similar to mid-to-late adolescents on the variables that distinguish the age cohorts as classes. As
noted, although the means may significantly differ, there is a great
deal of overlap between the distributions. A regrettable number of
adults are immature and have dreadful judgment. Yet we do not
excuse that minority of adults. Why, therefore, should adolescents
be treated differently? Adults obviously have more experience with
the consequences of their behavior and more life experience generally and some mature as a result, but many do not. Impulsive or
peer oriented adults probably have always "learned" less from experience than their more mature counterparts. Moreover, it does not
take much life experience to understand how killing, raping, burning, stealing, and so on affects others. To understand the consequences of these actions does not require the sophistication and
moral subtlety that only experience can provide.I 28
127 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 49 ("The question of juvenile responsibility is
not simply whether juveniles are generally different from adults. Surely they are in
many ways. The real issue is whether they are morally different, and the resolution of
that issue depends on whether a moral theory we accept dictates that the variables
that behaviorally distinguish juveniles should also diminish their responsibility."); id.
at 50 ("If responsibility is treated as a matter of retrospective moral evaluation, as I
suggested it essentially is and should be, then the plasticity or amenability to treatment of a variable is irrelevant to whether it diminishes moral responsibility. Responsibility should be mitigated or excused if a variable that diminishes responsibility was
operative at the time of harm doing, whether or not this characteristic is alterable, and
vice versa. It is hard to imagine what moral theory would suggest that plasticity per se
should reduce responsibility. To the extent that fault is a necessary or sufficient condition for full responsibility, plasticity is irrelevant.").
128 Id. at 58. Also see, NoiVin Richards, Criminal Children, 16 LAw & PHIL. 63
(1997), who rejects arguments that adolescents should be presumptively nonculpable
for crime because of their relative lack of life experience:
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Of course, it may be the case that some, many, or even most children lack the necessary capacities to be held guilty of crime. But if
this is true, it serves only as an argument for evaluating juvenile defendants individually (as we do all other defendants) for the purpose
of deciding whether or not they meet the test of criminal responsibility. This question is usually decided during the criminal adjudication
process rather than by a bright-line a priori rule that bars, or even
presumptively bars, children from criminal responsibility.
Thus, the mainstream literature on juvenile responsibility makes
a core, and erroneous, assumption: that if children as a class think
differently from adults as a class, these differences ought to matter to
children's criminal responsibility. But this simply does not follow. Indeed, it is hard to see why the mere fact that there exist differences in
judgment and decision-making capacity between juveniles and adults
is at all relevant to the question of juvenile liability for crime. Instead,
the core questions ought to be, (1) what are the threshold capacities
required for criminal liability, and (2) do juveniles have those capacities?129 This inquiry, in turn, has both normative and descriptive
dimensions. With respect to the normative dimension-upon what
threshold capacities should the law insist before holding someone
guilty of a crime?-many different answers are possible, and the issue
of differences between juveniles and adults is only derivatively relevant. With respect to the descriptive dimension-what threshold capacities does the law in fact insist upon before holding someone
criminally liable?-comparisons between all juveniles and all adults
are much less relevant than comparisons between juvenile and adult
criminals. To answer the descriptive question what we need to know is
not whether juveniles differ from adults but whether adults who have
been convicted and punished for committing serious crimes differ, as
a class and in relevant ways, from juveniles who have committed substantively identical acts. Surely no one would be surprised to discover
that as a group, violent adult felons possess weaker future orientation,
are less risk-averse, and are more impulsive than either adults or
Take murder, for example. The main thing wrong with murdering someone
is that you take this person's life against his will. [Adolescents] certainly
know that much about it. Indeed, if they did not know they were taking
someone's life against his will they would not be guilty of murder at all, but
of some lesser crime .... What we need is an extra, additional wrong done
in committing murder, a wrong that adolescents do not realize they are doing because they lack experience in life. There are no obvious candidates.
!d. at 72-73.
129 See, e.g., supra Part l.A.2.
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juveniles generally. 130 The harder question is, do violent adult offenders demonstrate significantly different levels of future orientation, risk
aversion, and impulsivity than do juveniles who commit the same offenses? Only if that question can be answered in the affirmative might
such differences be allowed to affect the criminal blameworthiness of
individuals in either class.
Finally, consider the argument that adolescents may be more susceptible to environmental influence, from peers and surrounding social pressures, and are therefore more likely to feel pressured into
criminal acts than are adults. 131 From the perspective of culpability
for crime, this argument seems to cut both ways. If juveniles are more
likely to be influenced by the signals from their environment, and
they otherwise possess the threshold capacities for criminal responsibility, then perhaps the law should focus on sending strong anti:"criminogenic"132 signals to the class of potential juvenile offenders.
In this connection, evidence indicates that juvenile offenders are
often well aware that the law treats them more leniently than it does
adults, and that some are quite willing to take advantage of this fact.
Street gangs, for example, actively recruit young children for criminal
acts because they know that such children are unlikely to be convicted
and punished as criminals. 133 And some individual offenders are no
less savvy. Recall the murder by Christopher Simmons, which became
the subject on appeal of the Supreme Court's recent holding in Roper
v. Simmons, 134 that defendants who are under age eighteen at the time
130 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 53 (acknowledging that, as a class, adolescents
are less risk-averse, more impulsive, and are more susceptible to peer pressure than
adults).
It is crucial to remember, however, that a finding of a statistically significant
difference between groups does not mean that there is no overlap between
them. In fact, the adolescent and adult distributions on these variables overlap considerably; large numbers of adolescents and adults are indistinguishable on measures of these variables.
I d.
131 See, e.g., Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 832 ("[A)dolescents in high crime
neighborhoods are subject both to unique social pressures that induce them to join in
criminal activity and to restrictions on their freedom that tangibly limit their ability to
escape. These restrictions are constitutive of a well-defined legal status resulting from
youthful dependency that substantially limits autonomy.").
132 See, e.g., id. ("[T)hose whom psychologists call normative adolescents may well
succumb to the extraordinary pressures of a criminogenic social context.").
133 For example, Paul Robinson recounts the case of Robert "Yummy" Sandifer,
who joined the "Black Disciples" in Chicago at age eight by explaining: "Young members like Robert are prized because they are immune from detention for more than
30 days." RoBINSON, supra note 52, at 134.
134 543 u.s. 551 (2005).
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of their crimes may not be executed. 135 Simmons, who was seventeen
at the time of his crime, informed two friends that he wanted to murder someone by breaking into the victim's house, tying the victim up,
and throwing the victim off a bridge. 136 According to the account
offered by Justice Kennedy in his mcyority opinion for the Court, Simmons and one of his friends then selected Shirley Crook as their victim and carried out their plan to the letter. 137 Before the murder,
Simmons had confidently informed his friends that they could "get
away with it" because they were juveniles. 138 To the extent that
juveniles are especially sensitive to the criminogenic elements in their
environment, perhaps failing to punish blameworthy adolescent offenders for crime actually adds to the pathological content of that
environment?
Evidence of juvenile responsiveness to environmental influence
raises another core issue-that of corrigibility, or the potential for rehabilitation among juvenile offenders. That is the subject of Part II,
to which I now turn.

II.

THE REDEMPTION THESIS: PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION

I noted above that the almost universal academic opposition to
juvenile criminal liability is rooted in two widely held intuitions, one
involving children's potential guilt and the other involving their potential redeemability. 139 Part I evaluated the Culpability Thesis; in this
Part I examine the Redemption Thesis, the idea that even when the
state can prove the elements of a crime and can show that at the time
of the criminal act a juvenile offender was mentally culpable, it is
wrong to punish juveniles for crime because they have a greater capacity than adults to reform and become productive, non-offending
citizens.

135 Id. at 569.
136 !d. at 556.
137 Id. at 556-57. ("Using duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth and bind her
hands, the two perpetrators put Mrs. Crook in her minivan and drove to a state park.
They reinforced the bindings, covered her head with a towel, and walked her to a
railroad trestle spanning the Meramec River. There they tied her hands and feet
together with electrical wire, wrapped her whole face in duct tape and threw her from
the bridge, drowning her in the waters below.").
138 Id. at 556.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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Culpability v. Corrigibility

Opponents of juvenile liability argue that "only a relatively small
proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities
develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into
adulthood. Thus, predicting the development of relatively more permanent and enduring traits on the basis of risky behavior patterns
observed in adolescence is an uncertain business." 140 Once again, this
addresses the wrong question. It is certainly true that most risk taking
juveniles turn out to be productive and law abiding adults. But this
fact alone does not justify excluding juveniles as a class from criminal
responsibility. Instead, we must first answer a much more relevant
question: What percentage of violent juvenile offenders-juveniles
who have killed someone, or seriously attempted to do so, or have
committed armed robbery or assault and battery on another personturn their lives around and become peaceful and law abiding adults?
If virtually all such juveniles do so, then a persuasive case might be
made for sentencing juvenile cases on a treatment, rather than a punishment, model. If, on the other hand, most such juvenile offenders
continue to inflict serious harms on society until they are stopped by
force from doing so, then the redemption-based case for exempting
juveniles from punishment becomes much weaker. 141
It should be clear that a defendant's corrigibility-the relative
ease with which an offender or class of offenders might turn their lives
around-cannot determine a defendant's culpability for an act already
140 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 819-20.
141 See, e.g., Benjamin B. Lahey et al., Relation of Age of Onset to the Type and Severity
of Child and Adolescent Conduct Problems, 27 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PsvcHOL. 247, 247
(1999) ("Numerous researchers have reported a robust inverse relation between the
age of a youth's first conviction and his or her total number of convictions through
early adulthood. Youths who are first convicted earlier are convicted more times not
only because they began their 'criminal careers' earlier but also because they are convicted at higher rates at all ages into early adulthood. It is important to note that the
same inverse association has been found between age of onset and self-reported delinquent behavior in several community samples. This is important, as self-reports of
delinquency avoid the biases in detection, prosecution, and conviction that are inherent in official statistics." (citations omitted)); id. at 248 ("Moffitt coined the terms
'adolescent-limited' and 'life-course persistent' delinquency for these two groups of
youths. She hypothesized that youths who first engage in antisocial behavior during
childhood do so for different reasons than youths who first engage in antisocial behavior during adolescence. . . . (Although it should not be regarded as a closed question], the notion that there is an inverse relation between the age of onset of
antisocial behavior and the severity and persistence of antisocial behavior has had a
major impact on theories of delinquent behavior and the taxonomy of [conduct disorders)." (citations omitted)).
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done. 142 But corrigibility and culpability are often confused in this
context-even by the United States Supreme Court, which declared in
Roper v. Simmons that "[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be
reformed." 143 But this must be wrong. To the extent that a defendant's personal blameworthiness informs our decision about her criminal guilt for an already completed act-and few would deny that it
does 144-the likelihood of future criminal actions (or law abidingness)
cannot decide the liability issue. Ultimately, the decision as to liability
rests on our judgments about the person's mental culpability at the
time he or she did the act charged; mental culpability, in turn, centers
on what the person understood, desired, and was capable of doing at
that moment in time or during preparations beforehand. Thus, statistics purporting to show that young children in general are more amenable to treatment than adults, or that most adolescents grow out of
the tendency to engage in impulsive or risky behavior, add nothing to
the general debate about the elements of liability.
But this should not drive the issue of redemptive potential from
the criminal process altogether. Although corrigibility cannot answer
the question of liability for crime, it may well influence the decision as
to how much punishment a convicted criminal should receive. This
seems an avenue worth exploring, not least because if the discussion
in Part I of this Article is correct, mens rea offers only a very unstable
142 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 50 ("If responsibility is treated as a matter of
retrospective moral evaluation, as I suggested it essentially is and should be, then the
plasticity or amenability to treatment of a variable is irrelevant to whether it diminishes moral responsibility. Responsibility should be mitigated or excused if a variable
that diminishes responsibility was operative at the time of harmdoing, whether or not
this characteristic is alterable, and vice versa. It is hard to imagine what moral theory
would suggest that plasticity per se should reduce responsibility.").
143 Raper, 543 U.S. at 570.
144 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 31, at 16-17 ("I make the assumption, which is
almost universally shared in Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence, that desert
based on moral fault is at least a necessary pre-condition for just punishment. If
youths are to be adjudicated and punished like adults, it is therefore crucial to address the desert of youthful offenders."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 16, at 800
("The starting point [of our argument] is the principle of penal proportionality,
which is the foundation of any legitimate system of state punishment, Proportionality
holds that fair criminal punishment is measured not only by the amount of harm
caused or threatened by the actor, but also by his blameworthiness."); Franklin E.
Zimring, Penal Proportionality J!Yr the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and
Diminished Responsibility, in YouTH ON TRIAL, supra note 11, at 271, 272 ("A host of
subjective elements affect judgments of deserved punishment even though the victim
is just as dead in each different case."),
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bar to criminal liability. If children may only be excluded from criminal punishment to the extent that they are unable to form intent,
then only very young children-younger than six-year-old Brandon
T.-may be categorically excluded. But to a significant degree, our
uneasiness about punishing children for crime rests not on the intuition that children are incapable of intentional action, but on the intuitive judgment that children are more easily reformed than adultsthat to send someone to prison for life for an act, even a monstrous
act, committed while a juvenile is to waste a life that might well have
been productive if allowed to grow to adulthood outside of prison. 145
B.

Should Corrigibility Affect Punishment?

From the discussion above we can import the interim principle
that a defendant's capacity for rehabilitation enters the equation once
culpability has been established and the law is seeking to resolve the
question of punishment. "Is this person criminally responsible for
what he did?" is quite a different question from: "Should we punish
this person for what he did?" Our collective answer to that second
question has undergone dramatic changes over the past century.
The recent punitive turn toward juveniles in the criminal law, derives its core energy not from statistical differences between children
and adults, but from a sea change in our beliefs about crime and
criminals generally. The system of juvenile justice arose only secondarily because of children's perceived "differences;" its primary source of
inspiration was a view of human nature that could hardly be more
different from the view that now dominates our system of criminal
punishment.
1.

The Reign of Redemption

The change is evident in the title of Frank Allen's well known
book, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal. 146 A century ago, belief in
the criminal law as an agent of redemption reigned; that belief has
now virtually disappeared from the practices of the criminal law. 147
And the decline of that ideal in general may explain the criminal law's
punitive turn toward children in particular.
145 As Stephen Morse points out, on a purely retributive theory of punishment this
might not matter. Morse, supra note 31, at 50. But on a mixed theory, under which
both retributive and utilitarian concerns enter into the kind and degree of criminal
punishment inflicted-the likelihood of reform might be a valid or even important
factor on the utilitarian side of the calculus. Jd. at 50-51.
146 fRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981 ).
14 7 /d. at 32-33.
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More than two decades ago, Frank Allen foresaw this trend and
made it the basis for his Storrs Lectures at Yale. Allen wrote: "Although judgments may vary about precisely how far support for rehabilitative theories of penal treatment has eroded ... the central fact
appears inescapable: the rehabilitative ideal has declined in the
United States: the decline has been substantial, and it has been precipitous."148 Allen contrasts that decline with the near universal endorsement of that ideal, by lawmakers, courts, reformers, and the
academy, at the beginning of the twentieth century. 149 In their book
Reaffirming Rehabilitation, 150 authors Francis T. Cullen and Karen E.
Gilbert trace the belief in rehabilitation to the rise of the Progressive
movement in the United States in the early 1900s.I 5 I The Progressives
united strong opposition to retributivismi 52 with a transcendent optimism about the possibilities of a just state and-particularly relevant
here-of redeeming criminals via treatment rather than punishment.
Cullen and Gilbert wrote:
The flavor of the Progressives' perspective is well illustrated in
these 1912 remarks by Warren F. Spaulding, Secretary of the Massachusetts Prison Association: "Each criminal is an individual, and
should be treated as such .... Character and not conduct is the only
sound basis of treatment. Fundamental in the new scheme is ...
individualism. In the old system, the main question was, What did
he do? The main question should be, What is he? There can be no
148 !d. at 10.
149 !d. at 5 ("Appreciation of the decline of the rehabilitative ideal in the 1970s
requires an accurate understanding of its dominance in the United States for most of
the twentieth century."). Among other examples, Allen notes the U.S. Supreme
Court holding in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), declaring that
"' [r )etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation
and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."' ALLF.N, supra note 146, at 5 (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 248). Allen adds,
"There can be no doubt that Justice Black's dictum expressed the enlightened opinion, not only of the judiciary, but also of the public at large." !d.
150 FRANcis T. CuLLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION (1982).

151 Id. at 73-81.
152 Id. at 75-76 ("At the turn of the century, Charlton T. Lewis voiced sentiments
that would be echoed repeatedly in the years to come when he asserted that '(t]he
method of apportioning penalties according to degrees of guilt implied by defined
offenses is as completely discredited, and is as incapable of a part of any reasoned
system of social organization, as is the practice of astrology or ... witchcraft.' n ( quoting Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE LJ. 17, 18 (1889))). Lewis
prophesied, "the time will come when the moral mutilations of fixed terms of imprisonment will seem as barbarous and antiquated as the ear-lopping, nose-slitting and
head amputations of a century ago." Lewis, supra, at 29.
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intelligent treatment until more is known than the fact that a man
did a certain thing. It is as important to know why he did it." 153

As Cullen and Gilbert explain, the Progressives' belief in individualized treatment had a profound impact on the criminal law:
[T] he Progressives succeeded in a major renovation of the criminal
justice system. Within the space of two decades, their innovations
reformulated sentencing practices in the direction of indeterminacy, established the new bureaucratic structures of probation and
parole, created a separate system ofjuvenile justice, introduced wide discretionary powers throughout the legal process, and reaffirmed the
vitality of the rehabilitative idea. At the end of their era, nearly all
of the elements of the criminal justice system familiar to today's students of crime control were securely in place. Of equal significance,
the Progressives bequeathed a powerful rationale for the individualized treatment of offenders that would dominate American correctional policy until very recent times. 154

Note the implication: The non-punitive, treatment focused juvenile justice system was not created in isolation from the criminal justice process for adults, but merely as one part of the Progressives'
general plan to restructure the criminal law around the goal of rehabilitation. Cullen and Gilbert wrote that "the Progressives' therapeutic model received its most complete expression in the measures
formulated to control delinquent behavior." 155 The juvenile justice
system was just one manifestation-·-albeit a very important one-of a
widespread redemption-oriented ideology, an ideology that "received
its most complete expression" in the non-punitive treatment of youthful offenders. 156
2.

The Origin of Separation

But then what, on the Progressive model, explains the actual separation of juvenile offenders, and their separate treatment by the
criminal law? Despite the widespread popularity of the redemptive
approach in the early and mid-twentieth century, adult offenders were
never actually exempted from criminal guilt and punishment; only
juveniles were.
153 CuLLEN & GILBERT, supra note 150, at 77 (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting Warren F. Spaulding, The Treatment of Crime-Past, Present, Future, 3 J.
AM. INST. CRJM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 376, 378 (1912)).
154 Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
155 Id. at 80.
156 /d.
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To some extent this difference in treatment of juveniles and
adults simply reflected the limits of the politically possible rather than
any core difference in punishment rationales. The Progressives envisioned a system under which punishment would take a back seat to
rehabilitation for all criminal offenders, but even during the heyday
of this vision the pull of retribution was strong enough to prevent the
replacement of punishment with treatment for everyone. 157
It also seems true, however, that the fundamental principle underlying Progressive reform proposals for the criminal law generallythat is, their belief in the redemptive potential of all human beingsdoes suggest a basis for distinguishing between adults and juveniles
within a general framework of a corrections policy oriented toward
rehabilitation. If (as the Progressives believed) humans generally
have the capacity for redemption, and if that capacity justifies a therapeutic (as opposed to retributive) system of criminal sentencing, then
youthful offenders may have an even stronger case for treatment, and
against punishment, than do adults as a group. Remember that with
respect to the question of criminal culpability, the scholarship argues
that children lack relevant capacities, such as the ability to form intent,
or maturity of judgment. That lack, it is contended, ought to absolve
them from criminal responsibility, or at least diminish their responsibility, for crime.I 58 But when we move to the issue of punishment, the
children's rights argument takes on the opposite thrust. Children, it
is argued, have a greater capacity than adults in at least one area-the
capacity for change. Children are in process, are acutely susceptible
to environmental influences and such influences can greatly affect
their ultimate choices, behavior, and moral convictions. If even adult
criminal offenders have significant capacity for reform and rehabilitation (as the Progressives believed), then it seems to follow that children must possess such capacity to a greater, and perhaps to a much
greater, degree.
C.

Age and Corrigibility

It is tempting to conclude that even if children are sometimes
responsible for crime, it might not be good policy to punish them, or
at least to punish them as much as we do adults. On the widely accepted assumptions that (1) the state should limit the amount of de157 See, e.g., id. at 81 ("The Progressives' version of a criminal justice system fully
dedicated to the rehabilitation of criminal offenders was never achieved. While the
framework of a therapeutic state had been erected, the substance in many instances
was lacking.").
158 See supra Part I.A.2.
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liberate suffering it inflicts on people to that amount that achieves its
legitimate policy goals and no more, and that (2) one of the most important goals of punishment is that of specific deterrence, children's
greater redemptive potential may justify lesser punishment for the
crimes they commit.
But is it true that children as a class do, in fact, have more redemptive potential than do adults as a class? Some recent research
indicates that this intuition may be baseless-.that some youthful offenders, particularly those who begin committing serious crimes as
young children, may be quite difficult, or even impossible, to rehabilitate. As one recent article summarized the problem:
Numerous researchers have reported a robust inverse relation
between the age of a youth's first conviction and his or her total
number of convictions through eady adulthood. Youths who are
first convicted earlier are convicted more times not only because
they began their "criminal careers" earlier but also because they are
convicted at higher rates at all ages into early adulthood. It is important to note that the same inverse association has been found
between age of onset and self-reported delinquent behavior in several community samples. This is important, as self-reports of delinquency avoid the biases in detection, prosecution, and conviction
that are inherent in official statistics. Among 11- through IS-yearold boys who had engaged in any delinquent behavior, Tolan found
that the half of the sample with younger ages of onset (<12 years)
reported higher levels of almost all types of delinquent behaviors
during adolescence than the half of the sample with later ages of
onset. Similarly, in a subset of female and male youths from the ...
National Youth Survey, Tolan and Thomas found that youths who
reported first engaging in delinquent acts before age 12 were more
likely to engage in serious offenses and to continue to engage in
delinquent behavior during the 3 years following the onset of delinquent behavior. 159

Such findings, indicating "an inverse relation between age of onset
and the frequency, seriousness, and persistence of delinquency," 160 reLahey et al., supra note 141, at 247 (citations omitted).
/d.; see also Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisrr
cial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PsvcHoL. REv. 674, 690 (1993) (discussing
the tendency of some adolescents over others to continue their delinquent behavior
into adulthood). Professor Lahey credits Moffitt with coining the terms "adolescentlimited" and "life-course persistent" to describe two quite different developmental
pathways of delinquent activity and goes on to explain;
[Y]ouths who first engage in antisocial behavior during childhood do so for
different reasons than youths who first engage in antisocial behavior during
adolescence. Specifically, childhood-onset conduct problems result from
159
160
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inforce one intuition that seems to fuel the punitive turn of the criminal law toward juveniles-that there are in fact "Bad Seeds," who show
their criminal proclivities early, have little or no capacity for remorse
or reform, and who will continue to inflict harm on society until the
criminal law puts them out of commission. Individual cases in which
very young children commit atrocious crimes may reinforce this
impression. 161
According to psychiatrist Martin Blinder, six-year-old Brandon T.
was clearly in danger of becoming a "life-course persistent" offender.162 For Dr. Blinder-who evaluated Brandon to determine his
competency to stand trial for the assault on Ignacio Bermudez-the
signs were so marked in Brandon that, despite his youth, Blinder felt
confident in diagnosing him as a "psychopath in the making." 163 Consider this exchange between Dr. Blinder and an interviewer for the
television program Frontline:
Q: (W]hat were your first impressions of [Brandon T.]?
Blinder: My first impression was a perfectly ordinary, smiling,
outgoing young man. There was nothing about his demeanor or
his appearance to suggest that we were dealing with either a dangerearly neuropsychological deficits that cause cognitive delays, impulsivity, and
difficult temperament. In the presence of adverse childrearing environments, these characteristics contribute to the origins of conduct problems.
In contrast, the adolescent-onset group does not have predisposing neuropsychological dysfunction. Their delinquent behavior arises through the imitation of some of the nonaggressive antisocial behaviors of youths with
childhood onsets. They do so during adolescence because it is a period of
heightened peer influence and conflict regarding adult privileges.
Lahey et al., supra note 141, at 248.
161 See, e.g., the case of Robert Sandifer, who at age eleven murdered two teenaged
gang rivals. RoBINSON, supra note 52, at 134. Of Sandifer's childhood, Paul Robinson writes:
Robert's direction of development shows itself early. During a hospital stay
when he is not yet 3, a social worker says something that angers him. He
grabs a toy knife and charges the woman, screaming "Fuck you, you bitch.»
He jabs the rubber knife into the woman's arm, saying 'Tm going to cut
you."
... His first officially recforded offense, at age 9, is an armed robbery.
By age 11, [Yummy Sandifer) has compiled a rap sheet of 28 crimes, all but
five of which are felonies. His short detentions become less frequent when,
because of his violence toward other detained children, Family Services refuses to accept even temporary custody.
ld. at 134-35.
162 Frontline: Little Crimina£5, supra note 12.
163 !d.
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ous fellow, or one who was wrestling with mental retardation or
some obviously disabling psychiatric disorder.

Q: And following your examination, what diagnosis did you arrive at?
Blinder: I felt that he was a psychopath in the making. We tend
to reserve such a label for adults and we talk about juveniles who act
out in violent ways as suffering a conduct disorder. The use of the
term psychopath or antisocial personality is perhaps prematurely
pejorative and we don't ordinarily see the necessary signs and symptoms in one so young and someone so smalL So we don't use that
terms [sic) ... when we talk about juveniles. I certainly have never
used that term before. But this young man was so evidently suffused
with all of the findings, that, when they fully blossomed later in life,
will call for this diagnosis, that I was comfortable in talking about
him having a nascent sociopathic personality. Or a psychopath in
the making. 164
164

Interview with Dr. Martin Blinder, Forensic Psychiatrist, available at http:/ I
Asked
to speculate about Brandon T.'s probable future, Dr. Blinder's prognosis was grim:
I can say that the personality characteristics that I found in this young boy,
that seemed to drive him, and the absence of any inhibiting factors, the absence of empathy for his fellow kid and some of the other diagnostic features
[that) are so common in individuals who do go forward in a life of violence
and a life of crime, that I think we should have a great concern that we will
indeed be faced with what to do with this fellow on down the road . . . .
When he has his freedom and he has a bit of heft to him, I think statistically
there is some likelihood that he will act in a criminal fashion. Whether or
not ... this young man will definitively grow up to be John Dillinger, I can't
say. But I think had I examined John Dillinger when he was 6 years old, I
would have seen qualities very much like what I saw in this young man.
!d.
Asked "what can be done with a 6-year-old like this?", Dr. Blinder's response was no
more hopeful:
What do you do with a 6-year-old like this? One thing that works is that you
sequester them. So that they no longer have the society to attack. There are
obviously a variety of ethical, moral and psychological reasons why this may
not be a good or a permanent solution. But it's very tempting. To make
sure that they don't have the opportunity to do the kind of damage that we
know they are capable of. They are, at least theoretically, responsive to longterm psychotherapeutic intervention .... The problem, to me, stems from
my conviction that in this sort of character disorder-and certainly a character disorder of this early severity-it is probably largely genetic. Yes, certainly, being raised in a violent neighborhood and in a violent or less than
optimum home ... these things are not therapeutic. . . . But if it brings to
the table, if you will, a certain genetic structure, it's very difficult to modifY
that through behavioral or psychotherapeutic techniques.

www. pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/ shows/little/ interviews/blinder l.html.
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It may, in short, be true that at least some juvenile offendersthose who begin committing serious crimes while children and who
demonstrate neither empathy toward others nor remorse for the
harm they inflict-may be difficult or impossible to rehabilitate. And
this may be true although such youngsters are not legally insane; although they may appear to be normal in many ways; and although
they may understand that society condemns their actions and that, if
caught, the consequences of those actions could be extremely
unpleasant.
To the extent this is correct, it becomes more difficult to justify a
system of juvenile justice that treats all children as non-responsible
and/ or as non-punishable. Such a system makes the conscious determination to allow youthful defendants who intentionally commit serious crimes to remain outside the system of criminal punishment solely
because of their age. And that decision requires a stronger justification than has yet been offered to support it-especially because a system under which children are evaluated individually, and the decision
to punish them is made individually, would seem to be a more rational
method of balancing the legitimate interests of youthful defendants
against society's need for protection from violent offenders of any age.
This conclusion follows whatever the ultimate source, or cause, of
a particular juvenile's criminal behavior. Because children are so visibly under the control of adults, we tend to excuse their bad behavior
on the ground that the adults in their lives-or the societal environment in which they grow up-are the parties "really" responsible for
their acts. 165 But even setting aside the criminal law's general dislike
of assigning vicarious responsibility for crime, this approach proves
too much. A substantial, perhaps an overwhelming, percentage of
adults convicted of serious crimes such as murder, rape, and aggravated assault, suffered significant abuse as children and could persuasively argue that the abuse is causally related to their criminal actions
as adults. If we excuse children from punishment on the ground that
they have suffered from abuse, then we are intellectually compelled to
consider the identical argument in a case involving a severely abused
adult for whom the abuse is at least a but-for cause of the crimes with
which he is charged.
!d. Psychopaths are specifically excluded, in the Model Penal Code and state criminal
codes, from eligibility for the insanity defense on grounds of psychopathy. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CooE § 4.01 (2) (1962) (excluding psychopaths from successfully advancing the insanity defense solely on grounds of psychopathy); see also TEx. PENAL
CoDE ANN.§ 8.01 (b) (Vernon 2003) (excluding abnormality manifested only by criminal or antisocial behavior from the insanity defense).
165 See supra notes 112-14, 128 and accompanying text.
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CoNCLUSION

Consider the argument thus far. First, Part I concluded that the
longstanding basis for excluding juveniles as a class from criminal liability-that children and adolescents as a class are incapable, or are
less capable, than adults of forming criminal intent-is not true. Using the case of Brandon T. as a core example, I argued that even
young children can and do commit terrible crimes while possessing
the threshold capacities necessary for criminal responsibility. From
this perspective, the recent trend in the law-its increasing refusal to
insulate all juveniles, merely because of age, from criminal responsibility-is not irrational; on the contrary, it simply acknowledges that
the concept of mens rea, as it has been descriptively applied in our
criminal law, contains no internal bar to criminal responsibility for
children.
In Part II, assuming the potential for culpability, I explored the
most important basis for excluding juveniles from criminal punishment-namely, that juveniles as a class have a greater capacity for redemption than adults as a class. I discussed recent evidence
indicating that at least some juveniles-those who lack empathy, are
not remorseful for the harms they inflict, and begin violent lives of
crime before age twelve-may be difficult or impossible to rehabilitate. Once again, if this is true then the punitive turn toward juveniles
appears rational. It seems rational to acknowledge ( 1) that such persons deserve punishment, and (2) that society has a strong interest in
funneling them through the criminal process, to the extent of incarcerating them for long periods in order to prevent them from inflicting further harm on innocent victims. Moreover, representing
such incarceration as punishment rather than as treatment could have
anti-criminogenic effects on violent juveniles and/ or on juvenile risktaking generally. 166
166 Thus, for "adolescent-limited" offenders, whose behavior is marked by, and
motivated by, life-stage specific concerns such as peer influence and increased taste
for risk, criminal sentencing might focus on maximizing the potential for redemption. For "life-course-persistent" offenders, society's interest in self-protection might
dictate the infliction of more suffering, either because stronger tactics are required to
turn such juveniles around, or because we are prepared to acknowledge that rehabilitation is impossible in some cases; that some young offenders will continue to inflict
harm unless they are permanently removed from society. Of course it may often be
difficult-in some cases it might even be impossible-to tell with certainty which
juveniles are redeemable and which are not. Even if we begin the inquiry by acknowledging that some young offenders will end as psychopaths, and even if we have an
inkling about who they might be, the law should reach a very high level of certainty
about such things before incarcerating a teenager for life.
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Why, then, do most of us still cringe at the thought of sending a
six-year-old to prison, or to execution-even for an admittedly horrendous and intentional act? It is not because children can't act intentionally; they can. It is not only because children are more
redeemable than adults; not all are, it would seem; and if most are,
there is still the question of desert, of culpability for the act done,
whatever one hopes for reform in the future. We can hope that clearing away the debris left by the failed Culpability and Redemption theses will not have the effect of sending numberless troubled children to
prison, but will instead lead to a deeper exploration of the widespread
intuition that, despite the fact that they can do horrible and intentionally harmful acts, children should not be punished criminally, at least
to the same degree and in the same way as adults.
What explains the enduring strength of that intuition? I want to
suggest one possible answer. It's an answer that the law should take
seriously because it addresses a core tension in the way the law itself
treats children, and thus invites a specifically legal response.
Consider, on the one hand, the law's general attitude toward the
rights and status of children. Although the law of crime prohibits
adults from torturing children or subjecting them to abuse, the law
also affirmatively, and vigorously, enforces the rights of parents to direct the rearing, physical care, education, discipline, and external environment of their children. 167 Thus, assuming no evidence of
parental abuse, children normally have no legal recourse when their
parents decide to divorce, move, change their children's school, discipline their children, direct their religious education, or monitor their
social lives. The law-the United States Constitution itself-defends
parents' rights to make such decisions, 168 and thus enforces the con167 See, e.g.,James Dwyer, "Parents' Religion and Children s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights," 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1372 (1994) ("For those who would have
the State use its power and resources to improve the lives of children, parental rights
constitute the greatest legal obstacle to government intervention to protect children
from harmful parenting practices and to state efforts to assume greater authority over
the care and education of children. Legal commentators, whatever their views on the
proper distribution of child-rearing authority between parents and the State, universally assume that parents should have some rights with respect to the raising of their
children." (footnote omitted)). My thanks to Professor Dwyer for comments that
helped clarify the thinking in this section.
168 The Supreme Court has affirmed the rights of parents in a long line of decisions beginning in the 1920s. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982)
("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is protected by the 14th Amendment, and does not evaporate
simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of
their child to the State."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting
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finement of children to their families until the age of majority. No
other group of (unconvicted and uncommitted) persons is thus involuntarily subordinated, by law, to the power and authority of other
individuals.
At the same time it enforces the control of children by the family,
the law-as this Article makes clear-increasingly treats children as
autonomous adults for the purposes of criminal conviction and punishment. A strong argument can be made that this is both profoundly
contradictory and patently unjust. Substantial empirical evidence supports the widespread intuition that most children who commit violent
crimes come from backgrounds featuring core environmental and resource deficits as well as serious abuse and/ or deprivation within their
families. 169 As noted, absent evidence of serious abuse, the law enforces the confinement of children to those families. Unlike adult
criminals who, whatever their sufferings as children are not, by definition, living in legally-enforced subjection to their parents at the time
of their crimes, children of poverty-that is, most children who commit violent offenses-have been prematurely and often continuously
exposed to environments that make it all but impossible for such children to internalize the values implicit in the criminal law and to adopt
those values as their own. It seems unjust, in that context, to hold
children-especially young children who have had the least opportuthat custody, care, and nurture of children reside first in the parents, "[a]nd it is in
recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(noting that the Constitution protects liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment protects rights of parents to direct education of their children).
169 See, e.g., Patrick F. Fagan," The R£al Root Causes of Violent Crime: The Breakdown of
Marriage, Family, and Community" 1 (Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 1026 (1995),
available at http:/ /www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/BG1026.cfm ("A review of the
empirical evidence in the professional literature of the social sciences gives policymakers an insight into the root causes of crime. Consider, for instance: Over the past
thirty years, the rise in violent crime parallels the rise in families abandoned by fathers. High-crime neighborhoods are characterized by high concentrations of families abandoned by fathers. State-by-state analysis by Heritage scholars indicates that a
10 percent increase in the percentage of children living in single-parent homes leads
typically to a 17 percent increase in juvenile crime. The rate of violent teenage crime
corresponds with the number of families abandoned by futhers. The type of aggression and hostility demonstrated by a future criminal often is foreshadowed in unusual
aggressiveness as early as age five or six. . . . On the other hand: . . . Even in highcrime inner-city neighborhoods, well over 90 percent of children from safe, stable
homes do not become delinquents. By contrast only 10 percent of children from
unsafe, unstable homes in these neighborhoods avoid crime.").
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nity to perceive and make use of any exit options available-fully responsible as criminals, even for violent acts that inflict significant
harm.
Significantly, this is not a concern rooted in psychological or behavioral differences between children, or adolescents, and adults.
Whatever differences in ability, temperament, or proclivities separate
children from adults, it is almost certainly true that some children,
even pre-adolescent children, do possess the capacity to form intent,
do have a threshold understanding of the harm they intend to inflict,
and do possess the ability to assemble the means and execute on a
plan to commit that harm. Holding such children criminally responsible is not unjust because of any innate internal differences between
children and adults-but because of the different treatment of children by the law, the law's confinement of children to criminogenic
situations from which those children, unlike adults, have little or no
opportunity to escape. The law contributes to the predicament in
which they grow up, and the law, therefore, should acknowledge that
contribution by making it relevant to the question of criminal responsibility when the defendant is a child.
Other defenses of the "youth excuse" are of course possible; a full
exploration of such arguments is not possible here. If this Article has
offered a rational account of the national trend toward making
juveniles liable for crime and punishing them seriously for serious
crime, then it would seem that the traditional grounds for the "separation thesis"-the idea that children should be segregated from adults
for the purpose of acljudicating crime and deciding punishmenthave broken down under the pressure of the undeniable truth that
children do commit terrible crimes and that the prospects for redeeming at least some juvenile criminals may well be just as grim as
the prospects of redeeming adults. If so, and to the extent we still
seek separate and less punitive treatment for juvenile offenders,
other-and more persuasive-grounds must be found on which to
base such separation. But the rationale supporting that must begin by
acknowledging that neither the doctrinal elements of the criminal law
nor the redemptive rationale for imposing punishment erect structural bars to convicting and punishing children for crime.

